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Abstract
Recent regulations promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency assert a
sweeping authority to preempt a broad array of state laws, including consumer protection laws,
applicable not only to national banks but to their state-chartered operating subsidiaries.  These
regulations threaten to disrupt state efforts to combat predatory lending and other abusive
practices and to interfere with a state’s sovereign authority over corporations chartered under
its laws.  Yet federal courts faced with challenges to these initiatives have failed to devote any
substantial analysis to claims based on the Tenth Amendment.  The problem with such claims is
the absence of any substantial doctrinal base in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.  
This article first explores the legal and policy implications of the preemption program and
identifies the consumer protection interests at stake and the states’ role in vindicating those
interests.  It then considers the importance of judicial review to the Framers’ federalism design
and endeavors to distill from their commentary and debates some substantive content for the
Tenth Amendment that federal courts could credibly enforce.  The article concludes with a
modest suggested template for doctrinal analysis of Tenth Amendment issues arising from
federal administrative action.  
After a promising start in life with the escutcheon of the original Bill of Rights, followed
by a period of disrepute owing to misuse as part of the seamy underbelly of racial animus’ legal
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1/ In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court struck down the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 as “repugnant to the Tenth Amendment.”  See Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE
L.J. 1582 (1977).  If, however, the Devil may quote scripture to his purpose, that is no reflection
on its author. The uses to which statutes or constitutional provisions may from time to time be
put is thus not a fair reflection on the intent of the drafters or the Framers, respectively:  So, too,
for the Tenth Amendment, which was, on the one hand, invoked by certain Senators to deny the
power of Congress to proscribe slavery in the southern slave states, see A. Christopher Bryant,
Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and “Irrevocable” Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J. L. &
POL’Y 501, 524-25 (2003), and, on the other hand, employed by Lincoln’s Secretary of the
Treasury (and later appointed by him as Chief Justice) Salmon P. Chase, as an argument
supporting invalidation of the Fugitive Slave Act.  See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1935-1875, at 110-111
(1982).  
2/
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend.
X  
3/ United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).  
4/ See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110
YALE L.J. 947, 964 n. 92 (characterizing “the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth
Amendment,” citing Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000)).  
5/ David D. Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interaction of the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air Act, 2 COL. J. ENVT’L L. 343 (1976).  
apparatus,1/ the Tenth Amendment2/ has vacillated between relegation to the scrap heap of 
constitutional surplusage -- a “mere truism”3/ -- to an “independent font of sovereignty.”4/  En
route, in its periodic bouts with the commerce power, it has encountered various way stations – 
characterizations, shorthand or otherwise, that eschew any precise analysis of its substantive
content: a “flimsy aid in withstanding federal power”;5/ “a limit upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
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6/ National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976).  
7/ Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
8/ New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).  
9/ Martha A.  Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The
Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 89 (1985).  
10/ Jack M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54
UMKC L. REV. 175, 194 (1986).  
11/ Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).  
12/ Linda Greenhouse, Court Takes the Glow Off the Tenth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1983, at § 4, p. 9, col. 1.  
13/ New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149.  See generally H. Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993).  Professor Powell’s
historical analysis of the origins of dual sovereignty demonstrates that even staunch Federalists
among the Framers came to accept it as axiomatic that “the Constitution’s delegations of power
to the federal government were sufficiently precise to demarcate distinct and separate spheres of
activity for the national and state governments.”  Id. at 655.  
regulate commerce”;6/ a “thinly veiled rationalization” for judicial second-guessing of Congress’
policy choices;7/ a “tautology” (i.e., any powers reserved to the states are self-evidently a
limitation on Congress’ Article I powers);8/ a “misguided doctrine”;9/ a “counter-insurgency”;10/
“an integral role . . . in our constitutional theory”;11/ and, most amusingly, a “constitutional frog
turned into a prince . . . [and] back into a frog”.12/
Recent federal intervention into the domain of commercial activities traditionally
regulated by the states call into question, once again, one of the “oldest questions of 
Constitutional law”13/ -- namely, the appropriate spheres of sovereign authority of the federal and
state governments and the proper relationship between them in our constitutional schema.  The
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14/ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.   Like the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause
has enjoyed a somewhat chaotic, though slightly less checkered, career, from the quaint and
anachronistic approach of cases such as United States v.  E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.1 (1895), to
that of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937,”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), to what future generations may well call the “Constitutional Revolution of 1995,”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).  
15/ Tabiya is a word employed by Russian chess masters to describe frequently
encountered, and often paradigmatic, positions that are worthy of intensive study and analysis.  
16/ 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  There is an older Supreme Court decision identically
denominated, New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).  See notes 18-21, infra, and
accompanying text.  
17/ 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
uneasy tension between, together with the protean substantive content ascribed to, the Commerce
Clause14/ and the Tenth Amendment, even after 200 years of constitutional jurisprudence,
continue to haunt this tabiya. 15/  Apart from some superficial clarity provided by cases, such as
the younger New York v. United States16/ and Printz v. United States, 17/ that interdict
congressional exercise of the commerce power in a manner that would “commandeer” state
legislatures or executive branch officials, Tenth Amendment jurisprudence remains chaotic,
conflicting, and, when all is said and done, rather rudimentary.  How, one wonders, in all this
time can the meaning of a single declarative sentence, enshrined in the Bill of Rights, have
evaded judicial construal establishing, at a minimum, some fundamental, bedrock level of state
sovereignty that the federal government cannot impinge?  
In the elder New York v. United States, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal
taxes on New York’s sale of mineral waters from a spa in Saratoga Springs notwithstanding the
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18/ 326 U.S. 572, 573 (1946).  
19/ See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger
Court, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 25 (1978); Laurence H.  Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1072 (1977); Balkin, supra note 10.  See also STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, THE REHNQUIST
COURT: IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (1994); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT:
THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1993).  
20/ 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
state’s claim that it was exercising an “essential government function.”18/  Victory based on that
concept would have to wait another 30 years, until National League of Cities, a case seen by
many as central to the agenda of a “conservative” jurist, then Associate Justice William H.
Rehnquist.19/  Yet it was perhaps the antithesis of a conservative jurist, the progressive William
O. Douglas, whose strident dissent in New York the elder decried the application of a “power to
tax is the power to destroy,” à la McCulloch v. Maryland20/ in reverse, and dismissed the notion
that a process-based approach (cf. Garcia) could ever be adequate to vindicate Tenth
Amendment concerns:
The notion that the sovereign position of the States must find its
protection in the will of a transient majority of Congress is foreign
to and a negation of our constitutional system. . . . The Constitution
is a compact between sovereigns.  The power of one sovereign to
tax another is an innovation so startling as to require explicit
authority if it is to be allowed.  If the power of the federal
government to tax the States is conceded, the reserved power of the
States guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment does not give them the
independence which they have always been assumed to have. 
They are relegated to a more servile status. . . . They must pay the
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21/ New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 594-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
22/ Another recent and highly publicized federal intervention affecting an area
traditionally dominated by state law is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
“SOXA”]. and the manifold regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission required to
be promulgated thereunder.  The SOXA regime is different in two very important respects from
the national bank preemption regime discussed in this article.  First, it was expressly authorized
by Congress.  Second, while it is layered on top of traditional state corporation law, it does not
unduly trammel the prerogatives of the states under the Tenth Amendment, any more than do the
federal securities laws; corporate law remains essentially the bailiwick of the states (at least for
the present), while corporate governance – which has not been addressed adequately (or, in most
cases, at all) by state legislation – is the subject of direct or indirect federal rulemaking (i.e., by
the SEC or by the stock exchanges that are subject to SEC oversight), and even then only with
respect to publicly traded companies.  Privately held companies, as well as other forms of
enterprise, including not-for-profit corporations, trusts, partnerships, and the like, are not subject
to SOXA.  
A recently published article urges the creation of another federal intervention into
traditional state turf, namely the inauguration of federal regulation of the rules of legal ethics for
business law practice, in order to stem the tide of abuse and predation that has been all too
prevalent in the major business scandals of our time.  See Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling:
Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 UNIV. OF MICH. J. L. REFORM 1017 (2004).  Here again,
however, the regulatory scheme suggested, even if it were adopted (which seems unlikely),
would not trammel the Tenth Amendment prerogatives of the States, as it would supplement, not
preempt, the authority (which is all too evidently moribund) of state high courts and state bar
associations to discipline business lawyers at elite law firms when they counsel, structure, or aid
and abet the kinds of corporate depredations that have given us the S&L crisis, BCCI, as well as
the more contemporary Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other scandals that continue to
festoon the headlines of our major newspapers.  
federal government for the privilege of exercising the powers of
sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitution. . . . 21/
The particular federal intervention providing the impetus for this article22/ is the assertion
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) of sweeping authority to preempt a
broad array of state laws of the sort that have for 150 years applied to the activities of national
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23/ The National Currency Act of 1863 provided, inter alia, for the creation of
entities possessing the authority to issue bank notes secured by United States Government bonds,
and for the creation within the Treasury Department of a separate bureau headed by the
Comptroller of the Currency.  National Currency Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863) (repealed
1864).  The statute was repealed and replaced by similar legislation the following year.  Act of
June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (current version in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31
U.S.C.).  While neither was officially titled “National Bank Act,” the two acts have come to be
known colloquially as such.  See Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, Pt. 1, 52
VA. L. REV. 565, 572 (1966).  
24/ Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
7, 34) [hereinafter “Preemption Regs”].  These regulations were originally proposed during the
preceding summer.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 (Aug. 5, 2003).  
25/ 517 U.S. 25 (1996).  See notes 85 - 93, infra, and accompanying text.  
26/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, at 1911-13.  
27/ Id. at 1913 (relying on a prior interpretation codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006).  
banks and coexisted with the provisions of the National Bank Act.23/  Early in 2004, OCC 
promulgated controversial regulations announcing a broad-based preemption of state laws that
affect the activities of national banks.24/  Embroidering rather liberally upon a concept from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Barnett Banks of Marion County v. Nelson,25/ the Preemption Regs
purport to preempt all state laws that “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to
fully [sic] exercise” its federally granted powers.26/  Interestingly, and even more controversially,
that preemption applies whether a national bank exercises such powers directly or through one or
more state-chartered operating subsidiaries.27/
After briefly summarizing the consumer protection interests at stake and the role of the
States in vindicating those interests, Part I of this article highlights some of the more problematic
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28/ Obviously, these regulations implicate a wealth of technical, bank regulatory
issues that are largely (though, as will be seen below, not totally) outside the scope of this
discussion.  For more detail on those issues, as well as important contributions to the debate
thereon, see the mini-symposium “Point-Counterpoint: Federal Preemption,” 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. LAW 225 (2004), which pairs the following articles on the subject: Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a
Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. LAW 225 (2004); Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins, National Bank Act Preemption:
The OCC’s New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer Protection or the Dual Banking
System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365 (2004).  See also Robert C. Eager & Cantwell F. 
Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual
Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21 (2004).  None of these articles, however, valuable as
they are, devotes any substantial consideration to the role of the Tenth Amendment (though
Professor Wilmarth mentions it in passing).  
29/ Equity stripping involves a loan made solely on the basis of a homeowner’s equity
(continued...)
aspects of the OCC’s Preemption Regs and Visitorial Powers Regs,28/ including consideration of
the proper view to be accorded national bank operating subsidiaries.  Part II  considers the
importance of judicial review to the Framers’ federalism design and continues with discussion of
what can be distilled from the views of the Framers about the substantive content of the Tenth
Amendment.  Part III concludes with a modest suggested base line for doctrinal analysis of Tenth
Amendment issues.  
I
A.  State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws and Other Consumer Protection Initiatives
Predatory lending, a heinous but ill-defined practice usually involving manipulative sales
tactics; elderly, naive, minority, “subprime” or otherwise vulnerable borrowers; high credit costs;
and outrageous terms, has become rampant in America.  Common lending practices that have
come to be characterized as “predatory” include equity stripping,29/ loan flipping,30/ hidden
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29/(...continued)
in his or her home, regardless of whether the borrower has the financial ability to make
payments.  Of course, failure to make scheduled payments when due can lead to foreclosure and
loss of the home. 
30/ Here, a borrower having difficulty making loan payments is offered “relief” by
refinancing the existing indebtedness with a new, higher interest, longer term, and considerably
higher cost loan (together with the payment of points and various and sundry fees).   
31/ A balloon payment is a  large, lump-sum payment that comes due at the end of a
loan that has been structured so as to minimize regular monthly loan payments, which therefore,
even when timely and completely paid, fail to retire the loan balance over the term of the loan.
When a balloon payment comes due, the borrower must either pay it in full or refinance. 
Obviously, few borrowers, and fewer still among those low-to-moderate income borrowers that
are targeted by predatory lenders, have the financial resources to make the lump sum payment.
Refinancing, however, may not only prove onerous if interest rates have risen, but may be
problematic for borrowers with late payment histories and other credit problems.  (Those credit
problems may, of course, be the direct result of an original predatory loan that caused
delinquencies and marred their credit records).  If the borrowers cannot refinance on terms they
can manage or make their balloon payments, their loans will go into default.  
32/ This is the assessment of charges to the consumer for services that were not
requested and not needed, e.g., for products such as single premium credit insurance.  
33/ Payday loans are short-term (usually no more than two weeks, the most common
pay period), small cash advances, usually in the range of $100-$500, secured by the borrower’s
paycheck or, in the high-tech model, by electronic access to the borrower’s checking account. 
Sometimes, the security will be a personal check from the borrower rather than the paycheck.  
The lender will then deposit the check (or electronically debit the borrower’s account) unless the
borrower repays the loan in full and reclaims the check, pays a fee to extend the loan’s due date
for another two weeks (known as a “rollover”), or, in states that prohibit rollovers, refinances the
loan by paying another fee.  See, e.g., Jean Ann Fox, What Does It Take to Be a Loan Shark in
1998? A Report on the Payday Loan Industry, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION
1998 at 987, 990 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1047, 1998).  
The fees charged can be astonishingly high.  See, e.g, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA AND U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP
PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 6 (Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/paydayreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2004) (stating that fees are
(continued...)
balloon payments,31/ “packing” or “padding,”32/ high-cost payday lending,33/ “back-end”
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33/(...continued)
typically 400% and higher); Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for
a Small Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 589, 589
(2001) (“The typical annual percentage rate is at least 390 and averages close to 500 percent,
although advocates and credit code enforcement agencies have noted rates of 1,300 percent to
7,300 percent.”).  
34/ Examples include (i) late posting of monthly payments received from consumers
resulting in the charging of late fees and collection of additional interest; (ii) placing monthly
payments in “suspense” accounts, thereby leading to the imposition of unjustifiable late fees and
the collection of a larger amount of interest over the life of the loan; (iii) late payment from
escrowed funds of homeowner’s insurance, leading to cancellation of the borrower’s original
policy and then ordering by the lender of force-placed insurance at higher rates; (iv) delaying
credits and other favorable adjustments to the homeowner’s escrow account; and (v) conducting
unnecessary “drive-by” property inspections when the homeowner is not in default and then
imposing a charge on the customer.  For a particularly egregious example, involving outright
fabrication of indebtedness figures, see Maxwell v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In re Maxwell), 281
B.R. 101 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).  
35/ For a detailed, albeit now slightly outdated, enumeration of such practices, see
Patricia Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory Lending Practices, 5
CONSUMER ADVOC. 4 (1999).  
36/ According to the New York Attorney General, “African Americans at all income
levels are three times more likely to be denied loans from conventional banks, and Black and
Latino neighborhoods are six times more likely to rely on financing from sub-prime lenders.” 
Testimony of Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Attorney General, Before the Assembly Standing Comm. on
Banks Regarding the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Preemption of State Consumer
Protection Laws (Apr. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/occ_testimony.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  See
also Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 533, 544-545 (2004) (stating that “black borrowers account for a
disproportionately large share of subprime lending”), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Lax.pdf (last visited Dec. 23,
2004); DEPARTMENTS OF THE TREASURY AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 22-23 (2000) (finding that subprime loans for
(continued...)
profiteering,34/ and other artifices35/ ranging from common exploitation to outright
discrimination.36/  A recent attempt at defining predatory lending has characterized it as a
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refinancing were five times more likely in black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods, and
that nearly 40% of refinance loans even in upper-income black neighborhoods were subprime, as
compared with 5%  in upper-income white neighborhoods and 20% in lower-income white
neighborhoods), available at http:/www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (last visited
Dec. 23, 2004); Elizabeth A. Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Market: Suggested
Reforms in A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX. L. REV. 421, 425-26
(2003) (identifying such problems as “steering” minority customers to loans with less favorable
terms than their credit histories warrant and “reverse redlining”).  Cf. ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL.,
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT
28-29 (2000) (reporting research using mystery shoppers revealed ongoing racial discrimination
against blacks). 
37/ Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002).  
38/ Charter renting is a contractual arrangement between payday lenders and banks
(often national banks) located in states with no usury limits for consumer loans.  For example, a
national bank can export interest rates from the state where it is located to the borrower’s home
state, the usury laws of which are expressly preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 85.  See Beneficial Nat'l
Bank v. Anderson, 125 U.S. 1 (2003); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299 (1978).  The bank underwrites the loans, while the payday lender acts as loan originator
and collection agent, and the two split the exorbitant profits on the deal.  Cf. Barbara A. Rehm,
Tanoue Seeks to Halt “Renting” of Charters to Payday Loan Firms, AM. BANKER, June 14,
(continued...)
congeries of abusive loan terms or practices featuring one or more of the following: “(1) loans
structured to result in seriously disproportionate harm to borrowers; (2) harmful rent seeking; (3)
loans involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other forms of lack of transparency . . . that are
not actionable as fraud; and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal
redress.”37/
Engaging in these practices is a broad spectrum of lenders, prominent among which are
national banks acting either directly or indirectly (through affiliates or contractual arrangements,
such as “charter renting”).38/  Three brief examples of predatory lending should suffice, courtesy
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2000, at 4 (“Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Donna Tanoue . . . urged Congress to
crack down on banks that are so eager for fee income they ‘rent’ their charters to payday loan
companies.”).   See generally Scott Andrew Schaff, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation
of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339 (2001).  
39/ Testimony of Diana L. Taylor, New York Superintendent of Banks, on OCC
Preemption Before the New York State Assembly Banks Committee 1 (Apr. 16, 2004), available 
at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/sp040416.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  The practices
identified were in violation of New York’s Deceptive Practices Act and anti-predatory lending
regulation.  Id. at 2.  
of the State of New York.  The first involves a 72-year-old woman identified as “Mrs. N.,” who
lived in the same residence in Elmhurst, Queens for more than 30 years and who was solicited by
a broker to refinance her mortgage because she had a $2,200 tax lien on her property.  
The broker told Mrs. N. that she would be able to get an
affordable refinance that would reduce her existing interest rate of
9 percent.  She ended up with a $105,000 loan from an operating
subsidiary of a Midwest-based national bank that raised her interest
rate to 10.5 percent and her monthly payment by nearly $200. 
Even worse, because her new loan is an Adjustable Rate Mortgage,
her interest rate could grow too [sic] as high as 16.375 percent.
Mrs.  N.’s new monthly payments comprise 67 percent of
her monthly income from Social Security and pension.  Her sole
benefit from the refinance was the payoff of the tax lien, which she
could have satisfied with direct payments to the New York City
Department of Finance through an affordable payment plan.
Instead, the refinance cost her nearly $11,000 in closing
costs (including more than $4,000 in fees), increased her monthly
payments to an unaffordable level, and put her at risk of
foreclosure.39/
The second example involved a 68-year-old man, identified as “Mr. M.,”who had resided
in Brooklyn for more than 20 years and had been forced to retire from the U.S. Postal Service
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40/ Id.
after 25 years.  Made desperate when the reduction in income caused him to fall behind in
mortgage payments, he sought to refinance with an operating subsidiary of a national bank:
The op-sub refinanced his $98,000 mortgage balance into a
$135,000 loan, which increased his monthly payments by more
than $500.  They [sic] urged him to refinance his [mounting] credit
card debt into the new mortgage, telling him that it would decrease
his monthly debt. . . .Unknown to Mr. M., the loan also included a
broker’s fee. 
Mr. and Mrs. M.’s joint monthly income at the time of the
loan was only about $1,800.  The lender made them a loan with
monthly payments of $1,367, not including taxes and insurance. 
When Mr. M. expressed concern about the amount of the monthly
payments, he was told that he could refinance at a lower rate if he
made his payments on time for a year.  The op-sub’s loan file
contained an unverified falsified lease for $900 a month with the
name of a nonexistent tenant.  Mr. M’s signature on the lease had
been forged.40/
The final example involved a lawsuit by the New York Attorney General against the
purchaser of a mortgage loan, First Horizon Home Loan Corporation, a Texas-chartered
operating subsidiary of First Tennessee Bank, N.A.  The loan amount was $27,000 at 8.5%
interest, payable over a 25-year term at $201.31 per month.  The borrower had made all 
payments due under the loan, and, after First Horizon acquired the loan, payments were made by
automatic debit from his checking account.  First Horizon continued to debit the account for
nearly four years after the loan was paid in full, thereby overcharging the borrower (who
mistakenly thought the mortgage was for 30 years) $9,461.57.  When the borrower brought this
to the First Horizon’s attention, it only then notified him that an error made by the loan originator
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41/ See generally Press Release: NY Sues National Bank Subsidiary for Illegal
Practices; Illegal Foreclosure Case May Test Feds’ New Preemption Rules (Jan. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jan/jan20a_04.html (last visited Dec. 23,
2004); People of the State of New York v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., filed Jan. 16, 2004,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/jan/Horizon5.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  
42/ OCC Advisory Letter AL2003-2 (Feb. 21, 2003) (setting forth “supervisory
guidance concerning lending practices that have been criticized as ‘predatory’ or ‘abusive’”),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
43/ OCC Advisory Letter AL2003-3 (Feb. 21, 2003) (advising national banks on “the
risks they confront if they make loans through brokers or obtain loans through purchase
transactions that contain terms or reflect practices that may be characterized as abusive or
‘predatory’”), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-3.pdf  (last visited Dec.
23, 2004). 
in 1974 had resulted in a $16 per month underpayment and that the maturity date of the mortgage
would be unilaterally extended to 2010, thus requiring him to pay an additional $25,163.75.  
When the borrower (who, as noted, had already overpaid) stopped the automatic debits, First
Horizon threatened to foreclose on his home if he did not pay $12,320.49 within 30 days.  After
unsuccessful attempts by the borrower’s attorney to resolve the matter amicably, the Attorney
General’s office became involved, but was met with a retort from First Horizon that, as an
operating subsidiary of a national bank, it could not discuss the matter because its sole regulator
was OCC, which had issued a directive advising First Horizon not to talk to state attorneys
general.41/
This is not to suggest that OCC encourages or even condones predatory lending.  Quite
the contrary: OCC has issued two advisory letters, one on loan originations42/ and another on
purchased loans,43/ and the former Comptroller himself delivered several hortatory speeches on
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44/ See Remarks by John D. Hawke, Jr. Comptroller of the Currency, Before a
Conference Sponsored by The Consumer Bankers Association & Robert Morris Associates, San
Francisco, California (June 7, 1999) (warning bankers of the potential costs of ignoring customer
service and identifying as not illegal, but potentially “abusive,” such practices as failure to report
to credit bureaus the good credit history of subprime borrowers (in order to avoid having them
“picked off by the competition)” and contracting with telemarketers for the offer to bank
customers of “trial memberships” that will result in a continuous series of monthly charges to the
customers’ accounts and will require affirmative action by the customers to opt out), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99-51a.doc (last visited Dec. 23, 2004); Remarks by John D.
Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Before the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition, Washington, D.C. (March 21, 2000) (deploring predatory lending, lamenting OCC’s
lack of authority to promulgate regulations defining unfair and deceptive practices, mentioning
OCC’s commitment to enforcing federal statutory schemes it is required to enforce (e.g., truth in
lending, equal credit opportunity), but concentrating on extolling the advantages of dealing with
mainstream depository institutions rather than check cashers, pawn shops, payday lenders, and
the like), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2001-21a.doc (last visited Dec. 23,
2004).  See also Statement of John D. Hawke, Jr. Comptroller of the Currency, Before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services U.S. House of Representatives (May 24, 2000)
(assuring Congress that “OCC is fully prepared to use its authority to combat abusive, unfair and
deceptive lending practices if they are engaged in by national banks,” that “we plan to issue
guidance that directs examiners to carefully review lending policies and practices to ensure that
they would not permit loans to be made without a reasonable expectation of repayment without
resort to the collateral,” and urging Congress to address predatory lending in the context of the
Community Reinvestment Act), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-37a.txt
(last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  
this and related subjects.44/  However, all this guidance and exhortation is directed more toward
“legal, reputational, and other risks, including credit risk assumed in cases where the borrower
lacks the ability to repay the loan without resorting to liquidation of the collateral” – in other
words, bank safety and soundness issues – than at consumer protection per se.  The only actual
regulatory prohibitions that OCC has promulgated are (1) against making real estate loans “based
predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower’s
collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms” (i.e.,
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45/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1917, amending 12 C.F.R. §
34.3(b) (2004).  This new found solicitude for predatory lending problems – a slight doff of the
cap to consumer protection coinciding with the assertion of preemptive power that threatens to
eviscerate it – is all the more striking since the prior version of § 34.3, which itself had been
amended only the year before with a Jan. 16, 2004 effective date, simply authorized secured real
estate lending (including making, arranging, purchasing, and selling such loans, or interests
therein), subject to the requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (specifically 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(o) prescribing uniform regulations to be promulgated by the various bank regulatory
agencies) and “such restrictions or requirements as [OCC] may prescribe by regulation or order.” 
46/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1917, adding 12 C.F.R. §
34.4(c).  
47/ Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking
Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58
BUS. LAW. 1243, 1244 (2003).  The authors suggest that the reason for the delay may be the
absence of the proscribed misconduct by banking institutions until relatively recently, but that
explanation seems dubious.  First, there have been numerous allegations of illegal or abusive
subprime lending practices directed against major national banks and their affiliates, including
some against Fleet (later FleetBoston, now part of Bank of America) going back more than 10
years.  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT’G OFF., CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, GAO-04-280, 37-38 (Jan.
2004) (reporting allegations against Citigroup and Fleet), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).  Indeed, the GAO notes
that “[i]n response to OCC’s and OTS’s statements that there is no evidence of predatory lending
among subsidiaries of federally regulated depository institutions, opponents of preemption noted
that there are several cases in which allegations of abusive lending practices involving some of
these subsidiaries have been raised.”  Id. at 71, citing Comments on OCC Working Paper, Center
for Responsible Lending 7-10, Oct. 6, 2003, available at http://www.predatorylending.org (last
(continued...)
prohibiting equity stripping);45/ and (2) against engaging in “unfair or deceptive trade practices
within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act” and the implementing
regulations of the FTC.46/  Addition of the latter is rather a hollow gesture, given that, as OCC
freely admits, it took OCC and the other federal banking agencies “more than twenty-five years
to reach consensus on their authority to enforce the FTC Act.”47/   The gesture becomes even
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visited Dec. 1, 2004).  See also Engel & McCoy, supra note 37, at 1296 (recounting allegations
against Citigroup); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1581 & n.47 (2002) (reporting allegations against Fleet);
id. at 1591 & n.90-92 (reporting press vilification of, and FTC proceeding against, Citigroup, in
connection with its acquisition of Associates).  Second, it was extraordinarily well-known in the
industry over a 10-year period that Providian Bank, N.A. was “the poster child of abusive
consumer practices, . . . was regularly sued in private litigation, subjected to numerous state
enforcement proceedings, and commonly criticized in the media.”  Letter to the Editor,
Comptroller Has Duty to Clean Up Card Pricing Mess, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 2003, at 17
(comments by Duncan A. MacDonald, former General Counsel of Citigroup’s European and
North American credit card business), available at 2003 WL 61300579.  It was only after a
California state prosecutor embarrassed OCC by moving publicly against Providian, much as
Eliot Spitzer has recently caused embarrassment to the SEC for its lackluster enforcement, that
OCC took administrative action.
48/ That authority was given to the Federal Reserve.  
49/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911.
50/ 12 U.S.C. § 1818.  
51/ For example, Wilmarth cites evidence that, since 1997, the four bank failures
costliest to the FDIC have been institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and
securitization, and that two of those four were national banks chartered and supervised by OCC. 
Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 312-313.  
hollower with OCC’s lament that it lacks particularized rulemaking authority to define specific
practices as unfair or deceptive48/ and is thus unable to proscribe under that rubric notorious
practices such as loan flipping or equity stripping.49/ OCC has yet to explain, however, why it
could not use its ample enforcement authority under Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act50/ to proscribe those practices as “unsafe or unsound banking practices”51/ and to work with
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52/ OCC’s arsenal of civil administrative enforcement powers includes cease and
desist orders, id. § 1818(b), removal of offending individuals from the banking industry under
statutorily specified circumstances, id. § 1818(e), and very substantial civil money penalties, id.,
§ 1818(i)(2).  
53/ For example, even with respect to diversified financial holding companies that are
normally subject to a federal scheme of regulatory oversight, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLEBA” – see infra note 87) not only preserves, in the insurance arena, the primacy of the
reverse preemption regime of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, infra note 87 (see GLEBA  § 104(a),
15 U.S.C. § 6701(a)), but also, in § 104(d)(2)(B), gives the states thirteen areas in which they
enjoy carte blanche to regulate.  These include: (i) protecting against rejection of insurance
policies required in connection with lending transactions solely because the insurer is not
affiliated with the lender; (ii) prohibiting extra charges on such required insurance if purchased
from unaffiliated agents; (iii) restricting advertisements or other promotional materials that might
misrepresent the status of any insurance product as being federally insured or guaranteed; (iv)
imposing licensing requirements on anyone receiving a commission or brokerage fee from the
sale of insurance; (v) prohibiting referral fees to unlicensed providers; (vi) regulating the
disclosure of insurance information to third parties without the insured's express written consent;
(vii) prohibiting the use of health information from the insured's health records without express
written consent; (viii) implementing anti-tying regimes; (ix) requiring anti-tying disclosures; (x)
requiring disclosure that the product is not a deposit, is not insured or guaranteed by the federal
government or by any financial institution or affiliate and, where appropriate, involves
investment risk; (xi) mandating separate documentation for credit and insurance transactions;
(xii) prohibiting the inclusion of credit insurance premiums in the primary credit transaction
without the customer's consent; and (xiii) mandating the maintenance of separate books and
records relating to insurance transactions, including consumer complaints, and the availability of
(continued...)
the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board to develop the requisite interpretations that would tar
those practices as “violations of law” sanctionable under the same statute.52/
B.  The OCC’s Preemption and Visitorial Powers Regulations
In the Preemption Regs, OCC, a bureau within the Department of the Treasury, takes the
position that it may proscribe the application of all state laws to national banks except in two
situations.  The first exception comprises those (relatively few) provisions of the National Bank
Act or other financial regulatory statutes53/ in which Congress expressly incorporates state-law
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such books and records for inspection by state insurance regulators.  15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(B)  
54/ The principal examples in the National Bank Act are those authorizing trust
powers pursuant to a separate OCC approval, 12 U.S.C. § 92a, and the branching provisions of
the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36, as amended by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat.  2338 (1994) [hereinafter
“IBBEA”].  
55/ See infra note 84.  
56/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, at 1911-13.  
57/ Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations, 69
Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000) [hereinafter “Visitorial
Powers Regs”].  
standards.54/  The statutes comprising this “exception” are more properly categorized as
affirmative reverse preemption regimes, which OCC has no discretion to alter, though its track
record of attempts at creative evasion is well established.55/.  The second exception is for
individual state laws (or, where appropriate, types of state laws) that OCC says it may, from time
to time, and solely within its own discretion, determine to have only an “incidental” effect on
national banks.  To be appropriately “incidental,” the state laws in question will (1) have to be
part of “the legal infrastructure that makes it practicable” for national banks to conduct their
federally-authorized activities, so long as (2) they “do not regulate the manner or content of the
business of banking authorized for national banks.”56/
In a companion rulemaking of even date,57/ the OCC amended its regulations governing
the exercise of “visitorial powers” over national banks in order to prohibit state officials from
filing suit (whether in federal or state court) to enjoin national banks to comply with state laws
and to remit them to the sole remedy of seeking declaratory relief.   Even then, armed with a
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58/ Id. at 1899-1900.  
59/ In 2003, OCC granted the request of National City Bank, N.A., National City
Bank of Indiana, N.A. and two operating subsidiaries for a determination that the Georgia Fair
Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 et seq., was preempted as to all national banks and their
operating subsidiaries.  Dept of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,464 (Aug. 5, 2003).    
60/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, at 1907-1908.  
61/ Id. at 1908.  
court-issued declaratory judgment, state officials may not, the OCC maintains, do anything other
than notify OCC, which will retain sole discretion whether to enforce that state law against the
national bank.58/
The new regulations codify positions the OCC has previously taken to preempt state
predatory lending laws.59/  For example, the preamble to the Preemption Regs explicates OCC’s
contention that state lending laws should, in general, be preempted.  “Markets for credit (both
consumer and commercial) . . . are now national, if not international, in scope,” and “the
elimination of legal and other barriers to interstate banking . . . has led a number of banking 
organizations to operate . . . on a multi-state or nationwide basis.”60/  The agency therefore
regards it as imperative that national banks be “enable[d] . . . to operate to the full extent of their
powers under Federal law, without interference from inconsistent state laws, consistent with the
national character of the national banking system.”61/
It cannot be gainsaid that the success rate of these theories in recent litigation has been
phenomenal.  OCC has won (or participated successfully in a case brought by a national bank) in
several preemption scenarios: preempting a Texas “par value” statute prohibiting banks in Texas,
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62/ Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, NA v. James, 321 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2003).  Notably,
the Fifth Circuit, while willing to accept OCC’s legal position, observed that, as a matter of
public policy, “competing interests could be better balanced . . . by a national Congress whose
interests are diverse and universal, or even by the people as they are represented in the state
legislatures, than by a solitary institution whose focus is a single industry.”  Id. at 494.  
63/ Bank of America NA v. Sorrell, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ga. 2002).  
64/ Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 
2002).  
65/ American Bankers Assoc. v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
OCC, as is its wont, filed an amicus brief in this litigation.  
66/ See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004);
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d 275 (D. Conn. 2004); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2003); National City Bank of Indiana v. Boutris,
2003 WL 21536818 (E.D. Cal. 2003).  
67/ One cannot entirely blame the lower federal courts for this.  Faced on the one
hand with a paucity of guidance from the Supreme Court on the substantive content of the Tenth
Amendment and with a crowded docket on the other hand, the better part of valor is to rely on
the analysis set forth in the parties’ submissions.  These, in turn, suffer from the same lack of
(continued...)
including national banks, from charging check cashing fees to non-customers;62/ preempting a
similar Georgia check cashing fee law;63/ preempting a municipal ordinance prohibiting banks
from charging ATM fees;64/ and preempting, as to federally chartered credit card issuers, a
California law imposing consumer protection disclosure requirements for credit card accounts.65/
Similarly, on the visitorial powers issue, OCC has prevailed as intervenor or amicus curiae in
several cases in which state authorities have been enjoined from regulating mortgage banking
operating subsidiaries of national banks.66/  In none of these cases, however, was the Tenth
Amendment paid more than lip service, with the courts buying into a simplistic “tautology”
approach67/ that may be summarized thus: Since we see no “commandeering” going on here,
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doctrinal guidance, and even the States that are litigants in this arena have not devoted substantial
legal resources to developing a coherent portrait of the Tenth Amendment and what is reserved to
them thereunder. 
68/ E.g., Watters, 334 F. Supp.2d at 966; Boutris, 265 F. Supp.2d at 1170-1171.
69/ U.S. CONST. art. VI.  
70/ Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).  
71/ E.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).  
72/ Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132  (1963).  
73/ Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).  
there is no Tenth Amendment interest of the states to protect, since banking is clearly commerce
and commerce falls within the powers granted to Congress.68/
To Congress – aye, there’s the rub (or at least a portion of the rub).  For it is to Congress,
and not to an obscure bureau (obscure, at least, to those who are not banking cognoscenti) within
an Executive Department of the United States, that the commerce power has been given.  The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution69/ provides Congress with the power to preempt state law.  
This occurs, as is well known, when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear
intent to preempt state law;70/ when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state
law;71/ where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible;72/ where there is implicit
in federal law a barrier to state regulation;73/ where Congress has legislated comprehensively,
thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the states to supplement
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74/ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).  
75/ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).  
76/ Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38  (1980) (emphasis added).  
77/ See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-154 (1982).  
78/ When Congress legislates in a field the States have traditionally occupied, the
Court will “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Rice
331 U.S. at 230, citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.  Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926); Allen-
Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).  
federal law;74/ or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full objectives of Congress.75/  None of these is applicable to the situation at hand.  Indeed,
the Supreme Court has recognized that “as a matter of history and as a matter of present
commercial reality, banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern.”76/
Preemption may result from action taken by a federal agency, but only where the agency
is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.77/  There is no reason to
believe that such is the case here.  Even if the OCC had arguable authority to act, the critical
question in any preemption analysis would still remain: whether Congress has unmistakably
indicated that federal regulation supersedes state law.78/  Again, that is not the case here.  Indeed,
as discussed below, Congress has taken a very different position on the dual banking system in
general and on state consumer protection laws in particular.  Before discussing those subjects in
the next section, however, a few observations about the legal and policy underpinnings of the
Preemption Regs and the Visitorial Powers Regs are in order.  
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79/ 12 U.S.C. § 36.  
80/
 First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).  
81/ During that same era, the Court had occasion to invalidate other OCC behavior it
found high-handed, such as the agency’s failure to provide any reasoned explanation for its
decisions.  See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S.
617 (1971).  
82/ OCC has learned from experience that if it makes these sorts of arguments often
(continued...)
First, it bears repeating that the initial “exception” noted by OCC is not really an
exception at all.  It is part of the statutory landscape that created OCC in the first place and by
which it is bound.  OCC learned this lesson the hard way with respect to the branching
authorization added in 1927 by an amendment to the National Bank Act known as the McFadden
Act.79/  That amendment, as part of a congressional policy of “competitive equality,” specifically
tied the branching power of a national bank in a given state to what state law permitted for state-
chartered banks.  When OCC nevertheless approved branch applications by two national banks in
Utah at locations where state banks were forbidden by state law to branch, the Supreme Court
invalidated the approvals in no uncertain terms.80/  Given the clarity of the statutory language,
one might wonder why the lower courts did not excoriate the agency for lawless behavior or why
the case was heard by the Supreme Court (unless it was to send a message).81/  OCC did have a
colorable legal argument, however.  Its position was that so long as Utah authorized banks to
branch at all, OCC was free to ignore any statutory conditions imposed by the state legislature
and authorize branching by national banks, even in a manner that deliberately flouted those
conditions.82/  The Court’s reaction was justifiably sarcastic: “It is a strange argument that
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enough, occasionally it will prevail.  See, e.g., Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover,
715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (accepting essentially the same argument to trump state
restrictions on branching by foreign banks), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984).  
83/ Walker Bank & Trust, 385 U.S. at 261.  
84/ See, e.g., First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969)
(invalidating armored car deposit pick-up service and shopping center lock box arrangements as
incompatible with state prohibitions on branch banking); Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1989) (invalidating OCC approval of deposit pick-up service as impermissible branch banking);
Dakota Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust of Fargo, 554 F.2d 345 (8th Cir.
1977) (enjoining the Comptroller from issuing a branch certificate after First National
successfully petitioned the Comptroller to have its existing branch recharacterized as an
“extension” so that the bank could then open a second branch), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877
(1977); St. Louis City Nat’l Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat’l Assoc., 548 F.2d 716 (8th
Cir.1976) (overruling OCC decision that a trust office, which did not accept deposits, make
loans, or pay checks, was not a branch and holding that the trust office was operating in violation
of state and thus federal law), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); State of Colorado ex rel. State
Banking Board v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Collins, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976) (overruling
OCC decision that automatic teller machines were not branch banks), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091
(1977);  State of Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis, 538 F.2d 219 (8th
Cir.1976)  (overruling OCC decision that automatic teller machines were not branch banks);
State of Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th
Cir.) (overruling OCC decision that automatic teller machines were not branch banks), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.)
(overruling OCC decision that automatic teller machines were not branch banks), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 862 (1976); Nebraskans for Indep. Banking, Inc. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 530 F.2d 755
(8th Cir.) (overruling OCC decision that a facility was not a branch office), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent state legislation, 426 U.S. 310 (1976).  
permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him.”83/  It took several more
judicial defeats invalidating administrative attempts to “end run” state restrictions84/ before OCC
finally internalized the message and rendered unto Congress that which is its exclusive preserve
(by actively lobbying for legislative reform of branch banking). 
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85/ At the time of the Barnett litigation, a significant number  (roughly half) of the
states had enacted anti-affiliation statutes.  Compare KAROL K. SPARKS, INSURANCE ACTIVITIES
OF BANKS  § 5.03 (1998) (identifying twenty states with anti-affiliation provisions (Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia) and another five (Alaska, Arizona, New York, Ohio,
and Texas) with similar statutory limitations on bank insurance activities), with Michael P.
Malloy, The Sound of Two Hands Flapping: Insurance-Related Activities of National Banks, 41
ST. LOUIS L.J. 75, 79 & n.44 (1996) (identifying fifteen states with “statutory provisions that
prohibit commercial banks from selling insurance” and another nine with laws that “may be
interpreted as imposing similar limitations”) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Backs Banks’
Sales of Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at D-1). 
These state anti-affiliation laws had previously shown themselves to be remarkably
impervious to constitutional challenge.  Among the better known anti-affiliation statutes was
Pennsylvania's, which prohibited companies selling insurance in that state (which was the fourth
largest insurance market in the country) from affiliation with a variety of depository institutions
and their holding companies, regardless of whether the depository institution existed in, or even
did business in, the state.  40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West Supp. 1994).  Ford Motor
Company and United Services Automobile Association, each a savings and loan holding
company, challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  Ford Motor Co. v. Ins. Comm’r, 874 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.
1989).  The Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania statute was preempted only to the extent that
it would prohibit acquisitions of failing thrift institutions, but not healthy ones, and sustained the
statute against the Commerce Clause challenge as well.  Id. at 928.  No preemption attack
predicated on 12 U.S.C. § 92 was involved in that case, however.
86/
“No [Florida licensed] insurance agent . . . who is associated with, . . . owned or
controlled by . . . a financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activities . . . .” FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 626.988(2) (West Supp. 1996).  The term “financial institution” was defined for
(continued...)
Second, the language of the Preemption Regs, while reminiscent of that used by the
Supreme Court in Barnett, is significantly different and more expansive.  In Barnett, Florida
insurance regulators challenged insurance sales pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92 by a national bank,
Barnett Bank.  Florida had on its statute books an anti-affiliation law,85/ which prohibited sales of
insurance by banks and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and employees,86/ and the principal legal
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this purpose to include “any bank . . . [except a] bank which is not a subsidiary or affiliate of a
bank holding company and is located in a city having a population of less than 5,000. . . .”  Id. §
626.988(1)(a).  
87/ 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.  
88/ 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).  
89/ Id.
90/ The Supreme Court has evolved somewhat inconsistent frameworks here.  See,
e.g., Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458
U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979); SEC v.
Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).  
91/ 12 U.S.C. § 92 provides, in pertinent part:
In addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking
(continued...)
issue was whether that anti-affiliation statute was preempted by the so-called “town of 5,000”
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 92.  This was not a typical preemption case, however, as it involved
insurance regulation and the special “reverse preemption” regime enacted by Congress in the
1940’s and known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act.87/  Under that regime, general purpose federal
statutes that happen to cause or encounter some interference or conflict with state insurance laws
do not preempt those laws but are themselves preempted.88/  If, however, the federal statute
“specifically relates to the business of insurance,” then the reverse preemption rule is
inapplicable and normal preemption analysis applies.89/
The precise contours of what constitutes the “business of insurance” for McCarran-
Ferguson purposes are complex and beyond the scope of this discussion.90/  Nonetheless, if 12
U.S.C. § 92 91/ does not “specifically relate[]” to the “business of insurance,” it is difficult to
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associations organized under the laws of the United States any
such association located and doing business in any place the
population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as
shown by the last preceding decennial census, may, under such
rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of
the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance
company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said
bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and
selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by
such company . . . .
92/ Barnett, 517 U.S. at 39-41.  
93/ Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted).  
94/ The underpinning is explicit, not merely implicit.  When the Preemption Regs
were initially proposed, OCC boldly asserted in the release that it enjoys preemption authority
(continued...)
imagine a statute that does.  The Supreme Court in Barnett reached the same conclusion, found
McCarran-Ferguson inapplicable,92/ and concluded that the Florida provision was, in fact,
preempted by § 92.  
In so doing, the Court established a standard for assessing the vitality of § 92 vis-a-vis
other types of state laws: A state may not 
forbid or impair significantly the exercise of a power that Congress
explicitly granted. to national banks.  To say this is not to deprive
States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here)
doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the
national bank's exercise of its powers. . . .93/
This language makes clear beyond peradventure that the Court emphatically does not
view the national banking laws as constituting field preemption.  Yet that is precisely the
suggestion underpinning the Preemption Regs,94/ as state bank regulators have observed in
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comparable to the field preemption approach that has long been taken by its sister agency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), in its regulations.  “The extent of Federal regulation and
supervision of Federal savings associations under the Home Owners’ Loan Act is substantially
the same as for national banks under the national banking laws, a fact that warrants similar
conclusions about the applicability of state laws to the conduct of the Federally authorized
activities of both types of entities.”  68 Fed. Reg. at 46,129 n.91.  See also Preemption Regs,
supra note 24, at 1914 (asserting that “the preemption regulations adopted by the OCC are
substantially identical to the preemption regulations of the OTS”).  The “field preemption”
regulations by the OTS – 12 C.F.R. §§ 557.11(b) (deposits), 560.2(a) (loans) -- are outside the
scope of this paper, but they date back to the predecessor agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, which embarked on a campaign to occupy the field after a poorly reasoned Supreme
Court decision upheld the agency’s authority to preempt California law regulating “due on sale”
clauses in mortgage contracts.  See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982).  
For a spirited discussion of the OTS field preemption regime and its consequences, see
Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 280-87.  
95/ Statement of Diana L. Taylor, New York Superintendent of Banking, on Behalf of
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, in Congressional Review of OCC Preemption:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations House Comm. on Financial
Services, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 145, 155 (Jan. 28, 2004) (prepared written testimony,
characterizing OCC regulations as “de facto field preemption”), available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/108-65.pdf  (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).  
96/ Preemption Regs, supra note 24, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1912, 1916-17.  
testimony before Congress.95/  Worse yet, OCC has paraphrased the Barnett standard in a manner
that distorts it, substantially expands it, and calls for preemption of myriad state laws that do not
“prevent” or “forbid” and do not “impair significantly” or “significantly interfere with” the
exercise by a national bank of its congressionally authorized powers.  OCC’s standard calls for
preemption where state laws “obstruct, impair [to any degree, not just significantly], or condition
a national bank’s ability to fully exercise the powers authorized to it under Federal law.”96/
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97/ Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified, as amended, in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “GLEBA”].  
98/ The implications extend even more broadly in those states that have “wild card”
statutes permitting state-chartered banks to exercise the same powers as national banks.  See
SPARKS, supra note 85, § 3.03[B][1].  
99/ 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A).  
100/ See, e.g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); BENJAMIN J.
KLEBANER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY 54-55 (1974); EUGENE
N. WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM (1900-1929)
11-15 (1983); Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary: The Case for Nonuniformity in State Law, 51
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 294, 322 (1997); David G.  Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16
(continued...)
As perhaps the only aspect of the pre-1999 bank-insurance regime that survived
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,97/ the above-quoted Barnett standard will, as OCC
well knows, continue to have significant implications for any state law with an impact on small
town insurance marketing activities by national banks.98/  In fact, Congress expressly endorsed
this standard and enshrined it in the insurance provisions of GLEBA in unmistakably clear
language:
In accordance with the legal standards for preemption set forth in
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett
Bank of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), no
State may, by statute, regulation, order, interpretation, or other
action, prevent or significantly interfere with the ability of a
depository institution, or an affiliate thereof, to engage, directly or
indirectly, either by itself or in conjunction with an affiliate or any
other person, in any insurance sales, solicitation, or crossmarketing
activity.99/
In fact, since Congress’ abortive, Civil-War era attempt to destroy the state banking
system by creating a federal currency and taxing state bank notes,100/ there has been both implicit
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HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 351 (1993).  
101/ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24.  
102/ The National Bank Act simply authorizes national banks “to make contracts” as
part of their general corporate powers, without further elaboration.  12 U.S.C. § 24 (Third).  
and explicit congressional recognition and endorsement of the dual system of federally chartered
and state-chartered banks coexisting in a competitive regulatory framework.  To be sure, national
banks are federally created instrumentalities in the sense that they are organized and existing
under the laws of the United States, as opposed to the laws of a particular state.  Nonetheless they
are privately owned businesses101/ that must be headquartered somewhere and do business
somewhere, and that somewhere is usually in one (or more, since the advent of interstate
branching with the IBBEA) of the 50 sovereign states (apart from those few in the District of
Columbia and U.S. territories).  While not organized under the laws of that state, the national
bank will, in the ordinary course of business, be indistinguishable from every other corporate
entity (whether chartered in that state or, having been chartered elsewhere, licensed to do
business in the state), financial or non-financial, in terms being a part of the local economy and
engaging in business and social intercourse implicating a broad array of quintessentially state
laws.  When the national bank hires executives and enters into employment agreements, those
agreements are not interpreted under any federal law of contracts but under state contract law.102/
When the national bank purchases or leases property for its head office or branches, those
transactions are governed by the property laws of the state, even though the bank’s authority to
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103/ See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (limited authority of national banks to own real estate).  
104/ Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code generally governs these subjects,
though other statutory schemes may apply depending upon the nature of the collateral, e.g., boats
(as in such states as California and Michigan, see, e.g., Gallatin Nat’l Bank v. Lockovich, 124
B.R. 660, 663 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1991)); insurance policies (which are excluded under U.C.C. § 9-
109(d)(8) and in which securities interests typically are “perfected” by notification to the
insurance company and inclusion of the secured party as a “loss payee”); copyrights (perfected
by recording in the United States Copyright Office, see, e.g., National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol
Fed. Sav.& Loan Assoc. of Denver, 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990)); and motor vehicles (state
certificate of title legislation).  
105/ 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
106/ 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).  
enter into them may simultaneously be circumscribed by federal law.103/  When the national bank
engages in asset-based financing and makes loans secured by personal property, questions of
enforceability, attachment, perfection, and priority of the security interests will perforce be
governed by state law.104/  If the national bank is negligent, for example by failing to shovel snow
off its premises, and business invitees are injured as a result of that negligence, state tort law will
govern.  Finally, if the national bank should engage in fraudulent conduct that violates the state’s
criminal laws, then the federal charter will be no defense to State criminal liability.  No
principled basis exists, then, for applying a different approach to state consumer protection
statutes.  These tenets are fundamental to the notions of comity that underlie “Our Federalism.”
Contrast purely federal instrumentalities, such as the Second Bank of the United States,
which gave rise to seminal opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland,105/ and Osborn v. Bank of the United States.106/  In the latter decision, Marshall was at
pains to point out that if the Second Bank had been a “mere private corporation” as opposed to
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107/ Id. at 859-60.  
108/ 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1869).  
the public corporation that it was, created to further the government’s fiscal operations, then it
would clearly have been subject to State legislation:
 The argument supposes the corporation to have been originated for
the management of an individual concern, to be founded upon
contract between individuals, having private trade and private
profit for its great end and principal object.  If these premises were
true, the conclusion drawn from them would be inevitable. This
mere private corporation, engaged in its own business, with its own
views, would certainly be subject to the taxing power of the State,
as any individual would be; and the casual circumstance of its
being employed by the government in the transaction of its fiscal
affairs, would no more exempt its private business from the
operation of that power, than it would exempt the private business
of any individual employed in the same manner. But the premises
are not true. The Bank is not considered as a private corporation,
whose principal object is individual trade and individual profit; but
as a public corporation, created for public and national purposes.
That the mere business of banking is, in its own nature, a private
business, and may be carried on by individuals or companies
having no political connexion with the government, is admitted;
but the Bank is not such an individual or company. It was not
created for its own sake, or for private purposes.107/
The same distinction, placing national banks squarely within the ranks of private business
enterprise subject to State legislation, was reiterated by the Court 50 years later – and only six
years after the creation of national banks by the National Currency Act of 1863 and the National
Bank Act of 1864 – in National Bank v. Commonwealth of Kentucky:108/
 [I]t certainly cannot be maintained that banks or other corporations
or instrumentalities of the government are to be wholly withdrawn
from the operation of State legislation.  The most important agents
of the Federal government are its officers, but no one will contend
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109/ Id. at 361-62.  
110/ To wit: 12 U.S.C. § 85 (prescribing a national usury law for national banks).  
111/ Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)
(construing 12 U.S.C. § 85).  
that when a man becomes an officer of the government he ceases to
be subject to the laws of the State.  The principle we are discussing
has its limitation,. . . [namely that] the agencies of the Federal
government are only exempted from State legislation, so far as that
legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficiency in
performing the functions by which they are designed to serve that
government.  Any other rule would convert a principle founded
alone in the necessity of securing to the government of the United
States the means of exercising its legitimate powers into an
unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the
States.109/
In practice, Congress has been quite assiduous in striving to maintain competitive parity
between the national and state banking systems.  For example, in 1978 a Supreme Court
decision, interpreting one of the few provisions of the National Bank Act having explicit
preemptive effect,110/ gave national banks a significant competitive edge in the credit card
business by allowing them (A)  to use “most favored lender” status to choose the highest interest
rate available to lenders (any lenders, not just banks) in the state and then (B) to export that all
over the country with preemptive effect over the usury laws of all other states.111/  To remedy the
competitive imbalance, Congress enacted Section 521 of the Depository Institutions
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112/ Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).  
113/ 12 U.S.C. § 1831a provides, in pertinent part:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions, including insured savings banks, ... with
respect to interest rates, ... such State bank[s] ... may,
notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve,
and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of
exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more
than 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the
Federal Reserve district where such State bank ... is located or at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where
the bank is located, whichever may be greater. 
114/ This was done in the IBBEA, supra note 56.  
115/ 12 U.S.C. § 36(f).  
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,112/ which duplicated for state-chartered banks
everything that 12 U.S.C. § 85 gave to national banks.113/
When, in 1994, interstate branching became the law of the land for the first time in U.S.
history, 114/Congress explicated its longstanding adherence to a  policy of “maintaining the
balance of Federal and State law under the dual banking system” and specified that the
application of state laws to national banks in the ordinary course of business is an essential
element of that policy.  Congress effectuated that policy by subjecting interstate branches of
national banks to the laws of their host states in four comprehensive categories: community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and branching intrastate.115/ The only exception
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116/
 H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (Conf. Rep.) (1994) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074.  
117/ With respect to mutual funds alone, Spitzer earned himself a stream of headlines
for uncovering breaches of fiduciary duty and sharp business practices that found the SEC’s
Division of Investment Management asleep at the switch.  See, e.g., Christopher Oster, Invesco
(continued...)
would be where federal law (i.e., an Act of Congress, not regulatory fiat) preempted the
application of such state laws to national banks.  As explained in the Conference Report:
States have a strong interest in the activities and operations of
depository institutions doing business within their jurisdictions,
regardless of the type of charter an institution holds. In particular,
States have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of their
consumers, businesses, and communities. Federal banking
agencies, through their opinion letters and interpretive rules on
preemption issues, play an important role in maintaining the
balance of Federal and State law under the dual banking system.
Congress does not intend that the [IBBEA] alter this balance and
thereby weaken States’ authority to protect the interests of their
consumers, businesses, or communities. 
Under well-established judicial principles, national banks are
subject to State law in many significant respects.... Courts
generally use a rule of construction that avoids finding a conflict
between the Federal and State law where possible. The [IBBEA]
does not change these judicially established principles.116/
Congress’ solicitude for the preservation of the dual system of financial services
regulation has recently paid unexpected public policy dividends with the proactive posture of
many state attorneys general in enforcing consumer protection statutes and combating financial
fraud that federal agencies were either unable or unwilling to detect and punish.  The New York
Attorney General alone, Eliot Spitzer, has brought to justice a variety of large Wall Street
investment banking firms, mutual fund complexes117/ (including some affiliated with major
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Charged in Scandal as Strong Quits; Strong’s Financial Chief Resigns, Plans to Shed
Controlling Stake Amid Mutual-Fund Investigation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at C1; David
Reilly, Regulators Begin to Investigate Funds in Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2003, at C7;
Christopher Oster, Mutual Funds Under Fire: Details Emerge on Security Trust Role; SEC Files
Civil Charges as Bank’s Executives Face Criminal Case in New York, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26,
2003, at C10; Tom Lauricella, Pilgrim and Baxter Face Charges; Mutual-Fund Firm’s Founders
Are Accused of Breach of Duty, Civil Fraud, by SEC and Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at
C1.  
banks), and, most recently, insurance companies.  OCC’s ill-considered preemption initiative
threatens to shut down many such proceedings, not merely with respect to national banks but, as
discussed in the next section, their state-chartered operating subsidiaries as well.  
C. Expanding Preemption to State-Chartered Bank Operating Subsidiaries
In the Preemption Regs and Visitorial Powers Regs, OCC has announced, by regulatory
fiat, that it will apply the same rules to operating subsidiaries of national banks as it has to the
banks themselves.  The rationale is simply that such operating subsidiaries are a convenient
organizational alternative to a separate department of a national bank and may only perform
those activities that the bank itself is authorized to perform.  This assertion of preemptive power
–  which, sadly, has been uncritically accepted by several courts -- stands the whole operating
subsidiary concept on its head.  
The concept of subsidiaries of national banks has always been surrounded by
controversy.  Part of the problem surrounds the differing interpretations of what constitutes the
“business of banking” under the relevant provision of the National Bank Act, Section 5136 of the
Revised Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, that a national bank may exercise 
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118/ 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (emphasis added).  
119/ See Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical Perspective,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 678-80 (1983).  
120/ As will be apparent from the discussion in Part II, infra, the Tenth Amendment
either guaranteed this view (from the point of view of the Anti-Federalists) or (from that of the
Federalists) underscored it.  
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by
receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining,
issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of title 62
of the Revised Statutes.118/
The interpretive question is whether the phrases that follow the emphasized language, and that
are separated therefrom by a semicolon, constitute a delineation of what constitutes the “business
of banking,” indicating (under an expressio unius est exclusio alterius approach) that items not
mentioned in the statute are not part of that business, or are merely exemplary, indicating (under
an ejusdem generis approach) that omitted items may nonetheless be considered part of that
business.  The former represents the so-called “narrow view” of the business of banking, the
latter the so-called “broad view.”119/
The narrow view, that national banks are statutory creatures of limited powers and can
exercise only those powers expressly granted them in the National Bank Act, is analogous to the
Framers’ view that, under our Constitution, the federal government is a government of limited
powers and that those powers not expressly granted to the federal government in the Constitution
are reserved to the States and the people.120/  Under this view, national banks are not authorized
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121/ The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to certain sections of
the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, particularly sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 (codified
as amended, respectively, at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh); 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed by
GLEBA in1999); 12 U.S.C. § 378; 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed by GLEBA in 1999)).  
122/
“The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited
to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and
for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account. . . .”  12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(emphasis added). This language immediately follows the language quoted supra in the text
accompanying note 120, supra.  
123/ This, at least, was OCC’s approach prior to the revisionist history position it
adopted in 1994.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1993) (former OCC operating subsidiary
regulation).  
to have subsidiaries absent a specific statutory authorization.  Far from providing such an
authorization, Section 5136, as amended by section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act,121/ expressly
limits the power of a national bank by forbidding its ownership of stock for its own account.122/
If a national bank cannot own stock for its own account, how, then, can it possibly own a
subsidiary?  
The OCC has traditionally taken a more expansive view.  Beginning in 1964, OCC
permitted a national bank to own the stock of a subsidiary, variously known as an “operations
subsidiary” or “operating subsidiary,” provided that it would not perform any function that the
bank could not perform directly.  In other words, activities conducted by operating subsidiaries
were treated the same as those conducted directly by the bank itself, subject to the same
limitations and restrictions as were applicable to the bank.123/  These mid-1960s OCC
pronouncements on operating subsidiaries engendered public disagreement on the subject
between OCC and the Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”), which took the position that section
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124/ See Member Bank Purchase of Stock of “Operation Subsidiaries”, 52 FED. RES.
BULL. 1151 (1966).  
125/ Fed. Res. Sys. Miscellaneous Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. § 250.141(c) (2001).  The
Board even went so far as to oppose legislation that would have prohibited a national bank from
engaging directly or indirectly in any activity that the Board had determined by regulation or
order to be an improper activity for bank holding companies.  See Competition in Banking Act of
1980: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 14
(1980).  
126/ See supra notes 114 - 116 and accompanying text.  
127/ See generally Federal Reserve Rules Regarding Loan Production Offices and
Purchases of Operating Subsidiaries: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong. (1968).  
16 of Glass-Steagall forbade any such subsidiary.124/  Ultimately, however, the Board reached an
entente with OCC and reversed its position on the subject: 
[A] bank [is permitted] to organize its operations in the manner
that it believes best facilitates the performance thereof.  One
method of organization is through departments; another is through
separate incorporation of particular operations.  In other words, a
wholly owned subsidiary corporation engaged in activities that the
bank itself may perform is simply a convenient alternative
organizational arrangement.125/
Consistent with the competition in regulation process that has long been a hallmark of the dual
banking system, similar powers were granted to subsidiaries of state banks under state law.126/
Although the House Banking Committee held hearings on this subject,127/  Congress
never took action to alter OCC’s position through legislation.  To the contrary, in the 1978
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), when operating subsidiaries were
already a common organizational device, Congress acknowledged the existence of operating
subsidiaries and provided that they were definitely not within the purview of the Board’s
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128/ An interesting parallel may be drawn with OCC’s approval of the establishment
of a discount brokerage subsidiary by a national bank, which was itself a subsidiary of a bank
holding company (BHC), at a time when discount brokerage had not yet been determined to be a
permissible activity under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843.  In the
litigation engendered by the discount brokerage applications, it was never suggested that a
BHC-owned bank, which in turn established a subsidiary to conduct an activity that OCC had
determined the bank itself could conduct, would cause the parent BHC to be in violation of the
BHC Act.  See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
129/ 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e) (emphasis added).  
regulatory power under the BHC Act, even where they were second-tier subsidiaries of a
BHC.128/  Those amendments added a new section 5(e) to the BHC Act: 
[T]he Board may, whenever it has reasonable cause to believe that
the continuation by a bank holding company of any activity or of
ownership or control of any of its nonbank subsidiaries, other than
a nonbank subsidiary of a bank, constitutes a serious risk to the
financial safety, soundness, or stability of a bank holding company
subsidiary bank and is inconsistent with sound banking principles .
. ., order the bank holding company or any such nonbank
subsidiaries . . . to terminate such activities or to terminate . . . its
ownership or control of any such subsidiary . . . .129/
Similarly, Congress excluded banks and their subsidiaries from the cease-and-desist authority
granted to the Board under section 8(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as also amended in
1978: 
Nothing in this subsection [cease-and-desist proceedings] or in
subsection (c) of this section [temporary cease-and-desist
proceedings] shall authorize any Federal banking agency, other
than the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to
issue a notice of charges or cease-and-desist order against a bank
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130/ Id. § 1818(b)(3) (emphasis added).  
131/ See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 410, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1515-16 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c).  
132/ 513 U.S. 251 (1995).  
133/ Id. at 258, n.2.  
holding company or any subsidiary thereof (other than a bank or
subsidiary of that bank).130/
Congress was therefore satisfied with the operating subsidiary concept as it had been
administered by the OCC under the National Bank Act and by the state bank supervisors under
state law.  Central to that concept was the treatment of the operating subsidiary as simply a
convenient organizational alternative to a department of the bank.  Indeed, in the Garn-St
Germain amendments to section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, Congress created the express
statutory distinction between loans by a bank to a subsidiary, which are not treated as loans to an
affiliate, and loans by a bank's subsidiary to an affiliate of the bank, which are treated as loans by
the bank to that affiliate.131/
In the mid-1990s, however, OCC announced an expansion on its already expansive view. 
Emboldened by its victory in Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co.,132/ which featured the use of an operating subsidiary to sell annuities and which expressly
held that OCC enjoyed significant latitude in determining what sort of activities might be
“incidental” to the “business of banking” under § 24 (Seventh),133/ OCC promulgated a revised
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134/ Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,034
(Nov. 29, 1994).  The revisions to Part 5 of OCC’s regulations originated in 1994 as part of a
comprehensive overhaul of the agency's regulations in an effort to “update and streamline” them,
pursuant to the mandate of section 303 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 4803 (1994).  
135/ OCC proposed to exempt operating subsidiaries from statutory restrictions on the
conduct of certain activities by the parent national bank where the agency believed the restriction
to be not necessarily applicable to the subsidiaries.  Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate
Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039.  
136/ The revised Part 5 operating subsidiary regulation was widely seen to be an
end-run around Glass-Steagall and insurance restrictions, as well as other activities (e.g., real
estate) forbidden to national banks themselves. See generally OCC Seeks Comment on Easing
Bank Rules, Opening Door for New Sub Power Requests, 63 BANKING REP. (BNA) 815 (Dec. 5,
1994). It was even suggested that these rules would open the door to European-style "universal
banking" in the United States.  Robert M. Garsson, OCC’s Paperwork Rewrite Paves the Way for
Banks To Expand Their Powers, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1995, at 3.  These impressions of the
potential breadth and significance of the operating subsidiary proposal persisted even two years
later, when the regulation was ultimately finalized.  See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Banks Rush
To Embrace New Freedoms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1-2 (describing how, availing
themselves of new Part 5 Rules, national banks plan to propose new or expanded activities
involving insurance, equipment leasing, municipal revenue bond underwriting, real estate
brokerage, and management and information processing).  
137/
 For a more sympathetic view, see James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries:
Free at Last or More of the Same?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1997). The rhetoric from Capitol
Hill and various trade associations was decidedly more negative, however.  See id. at 653,
673-74 (recounting responses from House Banking Committee Chairman Leach, former House
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Dingell, and others).  
operating subsidiary regulation134/ that contemplated authorizing activities for such subsidiaries
that were not permissible for the parent national bank.135/
This proposal sent shock waves136/ through the financial services industries and the halls
of Congress and was denounced as exceeding the scope of OCC’s statutory authority.137/  Initially
promulgated in 1994, the operating subsidiary proposal was shelved in the 104th Congress,
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138/ See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC May Get Upper Hand in Bid To Expand
Activities Allowed in Bank Subsidiaries, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 1996, at 4 (reporting OCC Chief
Counsel Julie L. Williams as saying the agency was in a “holding pattern” on the proposed Part 5
Rules and was “monitoring what Congress [was] doing”).  
139/ See H.R. 18, 104th Cong. (1995).  One month after his introduction of this
legislation, House Banking Committee Chairman Leach introduced a second version of the same
bill, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong. (1995), which became the principal vehicle for banking reform
legislation during that session of Congress and the bill that was marked up by both the House
Banking Committee and the House Commerce Committee.  
140/ See Justin Fox, Hopes for Wider Powers Now Pinned on Courts, Regulators--Not
Congress, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 1996, at 1.  
141/ Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342
(Nov. 26, 1996).  
142/ For example, within a year after the regulation was finalized, OCC relied on it to
permit a subsidiary of Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to engage in municipal
(continued...)
partly in response to the wave of critical reaction and partly in the hopes that it would be mooted
by enactment of a precursor to GLEBA,138/ the proposed Financial Services Competitiveness Act
of 1995.139/  However, when banking reform legislation failed to pass with the 104th Congress,140/
the proposal was dusted off and issued as a final regulation.141/
There, OCC declared that it would entertain, on a case-by-case basis, proposals for
operating subsidiaries to engage in activities that, while part of the “business of banking” or
“incidental” thereto, were nonetheless beyond the authority of the parent banks themselves.  In
light of the breadth of the Comptroller's discretion after NationsBank and the judicial deference it
would enjoy thereunder, confining those activities to what constitutes the “business of banking”
and its incidents was no limitation at all -- at least with respect to a broad array of securities and
insurance products and activities.142/  The newly constituted operating subsidiary thus represented
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142/(...continued)
revenue bond underwriting. OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997), available at
1997 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 127. Municipal revenue bonds are state or local bonds not backed by the
full faith and credit of the issuing authority, and as such could not (at that time, i.e., prior to
GLEBA) be underwritten by national banks, which were limited by § 24 (Seventh) to
underwriting only general obligation state and municipal bonds.  Interestingly, GLEBA expressly
amended that provision to authorize underwriting, dealing in, and purchasing (i.e., for the bank's
own account: purchases as agent were already permitted) various state and municipal revenue
bonds, limited obligation bonds, and other obligations that satisfy the requirements of §
142(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.  GLEBA § 151 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
143/ 15 U.S.C. § 6701(a).  
144/ A special, and rather abbreviated, limitations period is provided for.  No challenge
to an order, ruling, determination, or other action of a state insurance regulator or a federal
regulator may be filed after the later of the end of (i) the twelve-month period beginning on the
date the first public notice of such order, ruling, determination, or other action is made in its final
form, or (ii) the six-month period beginning on the date when such order, ruling, determination,
or other action becomes effective.  GLEBA § 104(d), 15 U.S.C. § 6714(d).
145/ The court of appeals has no more than sixty days to render its judgment, unless all
parties stipulate to an enlargement.  GLEBA § 304(b), 15 U.S.C. § 6714(b).  Any petition for
(continued...)
yet another, and potentially awesome, weapon in the OCC’s arsenal in aid of moving banks into
the realm of insurance.  
All that changed, however, with GLEBA, which represented the first true statutory
acknowledgment of national bank authority to have operating subsidiaries.  GLEBA not only
preserved – indeed, reaffirmed – the primacy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse preemption
regime143/ but also largely eliminated the possibility that banks could rely on judicial deference to
federal banking agency interpretations in this area.  Thus, in the case of a regulatory conflict over
insurance and reverse preemption issues between a state insurance regulator and a federal
regulator, either side may, subject to a special statute of limitations,144/ seek expedited145/ judicial
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145/(...continued)
Supreme Court review of the appellate court's judgment “shall be filed . . . as soon as practicable
after such judgment is issued.”  GLEBA § 304(c), 15 U.S.C. § 6714(c).  
146/
 GLEBA § 304(e), 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e) (emphasis added).  The court must decide
the matter “based on its review on the merits of all questions presented under State and Federal
law, including the nature of the product or activity and the history and purpose of its regulation
under State and Federal law.”  Id.
147/
 Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374-75  (1986).
Accord,  Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402, 1408, 1410 (10th Cir.
1984) aff’d, 474 U.S. 361 (1986).FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 73, 79
(continued...)
review in the appropriate federal circuit court, but such review must be “without unequal
deference.”146/  In general, the deference issue was a political “hot button” and led to this
compromise position, though the implementation of a functional regulation regime, the
enactment of a federal definition of “insurance,” and the reaffirmation of McCarran-Ferguson
already made it clear that OCC would have a much more difficult time approving bank entry into
insurance without the regulatory input of state insurance commissioners.  In such circumstances,
the Visitorial Powers Regs appear anomalous at best and blatantly lawless at worst.  
*        *        *
Whether the putative concerns animating OCC’s recent actions are legitimate is not the
question, only its authority to act as it is.  Axiomatic to our constitutional allocation of power is
that an agency cannot confer power upon itself.  That would usurp authority constitutionally
committed to the Congress.  “To permit an agency to expand its power in the face of a
congressional limitation on its jurisdiction would be to grant to the agency power to override
Congress. This we are both unwilling and unable to do.”147/
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(D.D.C. 1984), aff’d, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
148/ Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315  (1935).  
Separation of powers also has a federalism aspect in the proper allocation of powers
between the national government and the States.  For OCC to trespass on the States’ Tenth
Amendment-protected turf is equally as inimical to our constitutional scheme as its usurpation of
congressional prerogatives.  Part II will consider the importance of judicial review to the
Framers’ federalism design and then explore what constitutes the irreducible content of the
powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment.  
II
The primary regulator of any corporate entity is its chartering authority.  For federally
chartered depository institutions, such as national banks, that entity is the United States, but for
all of the affiliates of those institutions – including their parent holding companies, their sister
nonbank subsidiaries of those holding companies, and their operating subsidiaries – the
chartering authority is a sovereign state (as it is for state-chartered banks as well).  That state,
which brings such institutions into existence, has a legitimate and compelling interest in
preserving that existence in the current competitive realities of the financial services industry,
and in ensuring that those institutions serve the purposes for which they have been created.  
For over seventy years, it has been recognized that undue federal interference with this
principle of comity is a violation of the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.148/
As Justice Cardozo stated:  
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149/ Id. at 336-37 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
150/ U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
A corporation is a juristic person organized by government to
accomplish certain ends, which may be public or quasi-public,
though for other purposes of classification the corporation is
described as private. This is true of building and loan associations
in Wisconsin and in other states. They have been given corporate
capacity in the belief that their creation will advance the common
weal. The state, which brings them into being, has an interest in
preserving their existence, for only thus can they attain the ends of
their creation. They are more than business corporations. They
have been organized and nurtured as quasi public instruments . . . .
How they shall be formed, how maintained and supervised, and
how and when dissolved, are matters of governmental policy,
which it would be an intrusion for another government to regulate
by statute or decision, except when reasonably necessary for the
fair and effective exercise of some other and cognate power
explicitly conferred.149/
The court in Hopkins Federal invalidated an act of Congress as just such an unconstitutional
infringement of state sovereignty. Clearly, comparable action by the OCC – bereft of
congressional support, much less an “explicitly conferred” statutory authority – presents an a
fortiori case.
Relying on the Tenth Amendment as an independent source of reserved State power is
made difficult by the terse and general nature of a Constitutional one-liner: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”150/  While recent decisions of the Supreme Court
have reanimated its historic role as preserving the states from the abuses of excessive federal
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151/ See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(invalidating private suits for damages against states under Title I of Americans with Disabilities
Act); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (reversing federal conviction for arson, a
“paradigmatic common-law state crime,” on the ground that the commerce power does not reach
an owner-occupied dwelling used for no other purpose); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was not a valid exercise
of congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding, in
a case of first impression, that Congress lacks the power to subject a nonconsenting state to a
private suit for damages in the state’s own courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that federal trademark laws did not validly
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (holding that federal patent laws did not validly abrogate states’
sovereign immunity); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S 507 (1997) (holding that Religious
Freedom Restoration Act exceeded congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress had no
authority to compel state executive branch officials to enforce a federal regulatory program);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress has no power to
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun Free School Zones Act as
exceeding Congress’ commerce power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(holding that Congress has no authority to compel state legislatures to enact a federal regulatory
regime); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding Age Discrimination in Employment
Act’s mandatory retirement provisions inapplicable to state judges).  
152/ See notes 64-70, supra, and accompanying text.  
regulation,151/ the majority of these have not done much to establish a doctrinal base line for
Tenth Amendment analysis.  As a result, the lower federal courts have been chary of using what
is usually little more than “bare bones” citation of the Amendment in briefs by State parties as a
basis for challenging claims of federal preemption.  OCC’s success record on its preemption and
visitorial powers claims eloquently attests to that conclusion.152/
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153/ 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  
154/ E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).  
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,153/ which – New York and Printz
notwithstanding, has never been overruled -- raises questions about the independent force of the
Tenth Amendment but only under circumstances where Congress has explicitly legislated,
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority, in a manner intended to limit the authority of the
states over matters of coordinate state and federal concern.  Garcia thus continues to represent a
part of the pendulum swing of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in the Supreme Court.  At one
end of the pendulum’s arc are decisions, such as Garcia, predicated on the notion that the states’
political representation in the Congress will adequately protect their interests qua states.  At the
other end of the pendulum’s arc are those decisions based upon a theory of dual sovereignty of
state governments and the national government.154/  Implicit in these is the notion that there must
be some affirmative restrictions on the power of Congress, even when exercising plenary powers
granted under Article I.  
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155/ Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (although a
government of limited powers, federal government is supreme within its legitimate sphere, as in
the chartering of the Second Bank of the United States, and intrusion into that sphere by the
states, as with Maryland's attempt to impose a tax upon that bank, are invalid) with Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (invalidating grant of steamboat monopoly by State of New
York as inconsistent with federal licensing statute regulating interstate commerce, but excepting
commerce “completely internal to a state” as outside the federal sphere).  
156/ See 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4 at 814-815
(3d ed. 2000).  
157/ NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).  
158/ Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).  Cf. Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (“Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach
of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the
class.”).  
A.  Toward Judicial Review as the Ultimate Guardian of Reserved Rights
The initial rationale for the dual sovereignty approach – that federal and state
governments operated within different spheres of influence155/ -- was emasculated in the New
Deal-era decisions.  They used the simple expedient of expanding what was understood by
“interstate commerce” to encompass what Lawrence Tribe has called the “cumulative effect”
principle:156/  Congress has the power to regulate activities conducted wholly within one state not
only where the activities, in and of themselves, would have a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce,157/ but even where the activities are insignificant in themselves, so long as
the class of such activities, taken in the aggregate, would have an impact across state lines.158/
The most significant restrictions on this power have traditionally been the principles of
federalism.  Montesquieu, the French political theorist whose writings were well known to the
Framers of the Constitution, proceeded from the premise that every man invested with power is
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159/ See generally CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans. 6th ed. 1792).  The federal banking agencies’ more notorious
efforts to expand their power fall neatly within an ancient political precept.  See, e.g., Board of
Governors v.  Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986); Stoddard v. Board of Governors, 868
F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Saxon v.  Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1968); Am. Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992);  Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  See also id. at 642 (“Though the OCC is
surely familiar with its past defeats, it seems determined to repeat them,” referring to Saxon,
American Land Title, as well as holdings to the same effect in Commissioner v. Morris Trust,
367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966), and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d
1192 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 394 (1972)).  
160/ William T. Mayton, “The Fate of Lesser Voices”: Calhoun v. Wechsler on
Federalism, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1997), citing JOHN C. CALHOUN, A
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (1853), reprinted in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN CALHOUN 15 (Ross M. Lence, ed., 1992).  
161/ See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 269-71 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles
R.  Kessler, eds., 1999); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 277-78 (J.Madison) (Clinton Rossiter &
Charles R.  Kessler, eds., 1999).  
apt to abuse it and to carry his authority as far as he can.159/  In 1853, John C. Calhoun, an astute
lawyer-statesman whatever one may think of his politics, accurately predicted this would occur at
the hands of a self-aggrandizing super-faction he called the “federal majority,” which would
work at cross purposes to the will of the people and would endeavor, regardless of which
political party was in control of Congress, to dictate by fiat more and more federal control over
the states and the people.160/
The Framers’ own experience in the colonial era anticipated this problem as well and
persuaded them that tyranny was not limited to monarchs or their substitutes, but was a mischief
that could infect the legislative branch as well.161/  They had witnessed this first-hand through the
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162/ See generally JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES,
1607-1788 (1986); Charles Lofgren, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty,
and the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in CHARLES LOFGREN, GOVERNMENT FROM
REFLECTION AND CHOICE 70 (1986).  
163/ See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967).  
164/ Id. at 198-229.  
165/ GREENE, supra note 164, at 83; Lofgren, supra note 164, at 75.  
166/ BAILYN, supra note 165, at 223-28.  
imperial ambitions of the British Parliament.162/  Originally, the King and Parliament dealt at a
sovereign level with matters of policy outside the scope of the colonies, which enjoyed
considerable autonomy in self-governance (in fact if not in name).163/  Then, rather like Darth
Vader in the film The Empire Strikes Back, Parliament decided to “change the deal” and impose
on the colonies the financial burden of Britain’s imperial ambitions through a variety of taxation
schemes, including the infamous Stamp Act.  The colonists’ resistance was predicated not just on
their standing on their rights as Englishmen but in large part on their belief in the authority and
autonomy of colonial assemblies,164/ which they regarded as “the primary guardians of both the
individual liberties of their constituents and the corporate rights of the colonies.”165/ The more
Parliament insisted on complete and undivided sovereign power over the colonies, the more the
latter pressed the primacy of local governance.166/
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167/ These included, inter alia, disputes over obedience to the 1783 Treaty of Paris
that had ended the Revolutionary War and discriminatory tariff and customs laws, many of
which violated free trade provisions in the Articles of Confederation.  See Articles of
Confederation arts. IV, VI (1781).  See generally Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole
House, The New Jersey Plan, Tuesday, June 19, 1787 (James Madison), in 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 312, 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); LANCE
BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC 76-107 (1995) (noting Madison’s “alarm about abuses in the states... traced to the
debilities of the Confederation”); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.1 (3d ed. 1999); Thomas H. Lee, The
Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1830 (2004); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution:
The Original Understanding, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 85, 86-88 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978).  See also
Brannon P. Denning, Correspondence, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Prolegomenon
to a Defense, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1805-06  (2004).  Furthermore, many states had competing
claims to what were then known as the western territories, id., with Virginia enjoying perhaps the
best legal claim; a debilitating and possibly ruinous controversy was averted by agreement to
cede these lands to the Articles of Confederation Congress, though bickering over them
apparently persisted.  See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-
1789, at 108 -112 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1956).  
168/ See, e.g., Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope
of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 567 (1994).  
169/ See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  For more
recent synopses of the literature of collective action problems and regulatory capture, see Fisher,
supra note 24, at 1106-1121; Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41-56 (1998).  
After the Revolution, the regime of the Articles of Confederation led to serious
political167/ and economic difficulties168/ as states faced what 20th century economists would
describe as collective action problems.169/  When dissatisfaction with the weakness of the national
government vis-à-vis the states led to proposals to augment the authority of the former (which
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170/ U.S. CONST. art.  I, § 8.  
171/ For example, the states would now be forbidden from interfering in questions of
foreign relations and war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, in sharp contrast to the situation that obtained
under the Articles regime.  For example, several states attempted to carry on their own
diplomatic relations with foreign nations, even though such actions were prohibited by the
Articles of Confederation. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 356-57 (1969).  See also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1448 (1987) (arguing that in practice the United States under the Articles of
Confederation “was not much more than the 'United Nations' is in 1987: a mutual treaty
conveniently dishonored on all sides”).    
172/ THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. 
Kessler, eds., 1999).  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 211-14 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter &
Charles R.  Kessler, eds., 1999) (characterizing various elements of the proposed Constitution as
either “federal” or “national” in character).  In sum, mused Madison, it would be neither one nor
the other, but a combination of both.  “In its foundation, it is federal, not national; in the sources
(continued...)
would now have the power, inter alia, to levy taxes and duties, conduct foreign relations, raise,
operate, and pay an Army and Navy independent of State control, borrow money, and regulate
interstate and foreign commerce)170/ at the expense of the sovereignty of the latter,171/ memories
of the colonial experience were relatively fresh and animated the spirited debate between the
Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps.  
Based on this experience, the Framers’ ultimate solution was to diffuse power among the
various governmental entities, to limit the powers of the federal government, and to leave the
undefined remainder to the states and to the people: in short, as Madison put it, a 
compound republic . . .[in which] the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments.  Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people.  The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.172/
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172/(...continued)
from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly
national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again,
it is federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is
neither wholly federal nor wholly national.”  Id. at 214.  
173/ See, e.g., Essays of Brutus (No. 1), N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 367 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST] (expressing concern that the central government would exercise its commerce
power “as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single
government”); Essays of An Old Whig (No. 6), Indep. Gazetter, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 43 (arguing that the moment the power of taxation is given to
Congress, “we ought by consent to annihilate the individual states”).  
174/ See John Choon Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311, 1381 & n.301 (1997) (quoting an Anti-Federalist: “[T]he records of all ages and of all
nations [showed] that the liberties and the rights of the people have been always encroached on,
and finally destroyed by those, whom they had entrusted with the power of government . . . .”);
id. & n. 302 (quoting Brutus: “[I]t is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that
every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to
acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way.”).  
175/ In seeking legislation or regulation advantageous to their position, groups can
deflect the ultimate outcome away from the public good, in a way one commentator has
(continued...)
While inherent in this conception is a belief that the political branches of the national
government would, to a certain extent, guard state sovereignty against encroachment, a
considerable feeling emerged among the states that these protections would be adequate to stop
the “annihilation” of the state governments by the federal government.173/
Important historical scholarship by John Choon Yoo has demonstrated that these
concerns, as well as concerns about the government aggrandizing its power at the expense of the
governed174/ – concerns redolent, once again, of collective action problems involving self-
interested groups175/ – made the arguments of the Anti-Federalists increasingly difficult for the
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175/(...continued)
analogized to a form of “‘legislative auction’ where the special interest group with the highest
‘bid’ wins . . . .”  Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory
and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 182 (1996).  The interest groups “with the most
at stake in a regulatory decision will work most aggressively to influence that decision and are
likely to succeed in doing so.”  Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J.
883, 902 (2002).  Indeed, the theory suggests that self-interest utterly permeates the process:
“Citizens act to acquire the biggest piece of the collective resource pie at the lowest cost to
themselves; legislators act to acquire reelection; bureaucrats act to acquire more power (bigger
budget, wider authority, and so on) while in government and lucrative opportunities via the
revolving door when they leave.”  Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public
Choice and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2000).  
176/ Yoo, supra note 176, at 1381-82.  
177/ Id. at 1383-1391.  
Federalists to counter.  As Professor Yoo trenchantly summarizes the concern: “In modern
parlance, an ‘inside-the-beltway’ mentality would seize the minds of members of Congress, with
the result that accountability and responsibility between representative and the represented would
dissipate.  As the links of representation between constituent and official disappeared, the new
government would find it easy to rule by corruption and force.”176/  The impact, he demonstrates
persuasively, was ineluctably to give rise to emergence of the concept of judicial review as the
primary safeguard of the states.177/  If, instead, as Brutus observed, the national legislature were
the sole arbiter of the extent of its own power, “[t]he government would always say, their
measures were designed and calculated to promote the public good; and there being no judge
between them and the people, the rulers themselves must, and would always, judge for
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178/ Id. at 1383 & n. 308 (citing Brutus VI, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Dec. 27, 1787,
reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 619 (Bernard
Bailyn, ed., 1993) [hereinafter “DEBATE”].  
179/ Yoo, supra note 176, at 1383.  
180/ E.g., the prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, conferring title
of nobility, suspending the writ of habeas corpus, disproportionate taxation, etc., as set forth in
Article I, § 9.  
181/ E.g., proscriptions against States entering into treaties, alliances, or
confederations, coining money, granting letters of marque, passing their own bills of attainder or
ex post facto laws, etc., as set forth in Article I, § 10.  
themselves.”178/  In other words, as paraphrased by Yoo, “If Congress were the only judge of its
own powers, then the safeguards of a written Constitution would become meaningless.”179/
Likewise, the structure and phraseology of the Bill of Rights highlights the necessity for
protection by an independent judiciary.  None of the first ten amendments positively confers
individual rights and liberties upon the people.  Rather, they assert prohibitions against federal
trammeling of those rights and liberties and provide some specificity of what those limitations on
the federal legislative power are, beyond that articulated in the body of the Constitution,180/ which
also prescribes limitations on the powers of the States.181/  Ensconced at the very end of this
group of amendments is the Tenth, which serves a very lawyerly drafting function; it negates any
expressio unius est exclusio alterius construction by making the list of proscriptions exemplary
rather than inclusive, and vouchsafes all powers to the States and to the people that have neither
been explicitly conferred upon the Congress nor proscribed to the States.  Thus, rather than being
a grant of individual rights and liberties by positive law, the Bill of Rights establishes a structure
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whereby congressional abridgment of those rights and liberties is interdicted, thereby giving the
primary (though not necessarily the exclusive) role in protection and vindication of those rights
to the States.  
This is certainly consistent with the Framers’ then all-too-fresh experience with
preserving the fonts of their individual and collective freedom – the State assemblies –  from the
tyranny of Parliament.  What happens, however,  if the States should succumb to the power of
the federal purse strings and prostitute their sovereignty for a larger share of the federal pie?
What if the “double security” and fancy political safeguards of Madison’s “compound republic”
should fail and all the Anti-Federalists’ concerns about self-arrogation of power by the Congress
and abuses of that federal power should come home to roost?  The ultimate solution in the case
of Parliament and the British Crown was rebellion and armed conflict, but that is scarcely a
framework to be contemplated during a process of nation building.  
The Framers’ answer was, of course, review by an independent judiciary.  As Professor
Yoo observes:
Judicial review provides an important check on the temptation to
surrender state sovereignty voluntarily. . . or the possibility of
unconstitutional actions taken in the states in the heat of emotion. 
Just as importantly, however, judicial review prevents states that
are fully informed from sacrificing their sovereignty for some
greater financial gain.  Put in public choice terms, federalism and
the maintenance of a federal government of limited, enumerated
powers may be a positive externality that no individual state acting
individually or collectively fully internalizes.  In this sense, the
Framers viewed federalism as a normative good that ought to be
promoted despite any state’s momentary interest in reducing its
rights.  
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182/ Yoo, supra note 176, at 1402, 1404-1405..  
183/ 426 U.S. 833 (1976).  
. . . The Framers created judicial review in order to prevent any of
the branches or levels of government from exceeding the written
limitations on their powers.  The federal courts would prevent the
states from frustrating the legitimate exercise of national power,
and, on the flip side of the coin, they would block the national
government from infringing upon the independent sovereignty of
the states.  From this clashing of institutional interests, of
government competition, and of governmental power, the Framers
hoped that liberty would result. . . . 182/
For this to work, however, the judiciary cannot, in effect, abdicate its role of protecting
the sovereignty of the states from congressional trespass by unilaterally deciding to regard the
Tenth Amendment lynchpin as a tautology and ignore it.  After more than 200 years of
constitutional government, during the last 75 years of which many of the Anti-Federalists’ worst
fears have come to pass, the Tenth Amendment must be given some teeth.  
B.  Toward Defining a Basal Tenth Amendment
In National League of Cities v. Usery,183/ the Supreme Court applied the Tenth
Amendment to invalidate amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which sought to extend
the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions thereof to employees of state governments
and their political subdivisions.  As formulated in this decision, the Tenth Amendment protected
the states from congressional exercise of commerce clause authority in a manner that would
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184/ Id. at 849, 851-52.  
185/ Id. at 851.  
186/ As Hamilton put it, “The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily
fall under the superintendence of the local administrations and which will form so many rivulets
of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized without
involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 88 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R.  Kessler, eds.,
1999).  
impair “traditional state functions” or “integral state operations” or otherwise intrude upon
“essential attributes of state sovereignty.”184/  In the Court’s words: 
[I]t is functions such as these which governments are created to
provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally
afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States
the authority to make those fundamental . . . decisions upon which
their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we
think there would be little left of the States’ “separate and
independent existence.”185/
The purported difficulty with this approach, posited by the majority in Garcia, was that a
rule turning upon judicial assessment of what might constitute “integral” or “traditional” state
governmental functions was, in their view, doctrinally unsound and unworkable in practice. 
However, the difficulty in identifying such functions is surely exaggerated.  While it never would
have occurred to those with the Framers’ mindset to essay a comprehensive catalogue of areas
reserved to the states, not merely because it all seemed self-evident to them but also because such
an undertaking would have been simultaneously onerous and unenlightening,186/ a variety of
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187/ See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 590-91 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
188/ John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 20, 1788, in 2 DEBATE, supra
note 177, at 731-32.  
189/ THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 86 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. 
Kessler, eds., 1999).  
insights may be gleaned from various sources, most of which are collected in Justice Thomas’s
separate concurrence in Lopez.187/
No less a personage than John Marshall himself, at the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
readily identified areas such as “laws affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or
claims between citizens of the same state” as outside the delegated powers of Congress and,
therefore, the preserve of the states.188/  Another ardent Federalist, Alexander Hamilton (the
architect of the Bank of the United States), whose 18th century sensibilities obviously could not
predict 20th century political trends (“Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which
any reasonable man may require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons
intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of
[their residuary authority],”189/ nevertheless compiled a cogent catalogue on both sides of the
ledger:
 “The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State to me holds
out slender allurements to ambition.  Commerce, finance,
negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which
have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the
powers necessary to those objects ought in the first instance to be
lodged in the national repository.  The administration of private
justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of
agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those
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190/ Id.  (emphasis added).  Hamilton adds that were anyone at the federal level to
succumb to such a usurpation, “the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as
it would be nugatory” and “the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other
words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an
appetite.”  Id. at 17.  From these passages, one can but imagine the shock with which Hamilton
would have witnessed the “extravagant appetite” of the federal government in the post-New Deal
era, and particularly a case such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).  That said,
clearly Hamilton’s identification of domestic police power and the intra-state administration of
private justice is as sensible today as it was in 1787 and would likely appeal to a majority of the
current Supreme Court.  
191/ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
192/ THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 172 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. 
Kessler, eds., 1999).  
193/ 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (reversing conviction under federal arson statute on the
ground that owner-occupied dwelling was not “used . . . in activities affecting . . . commerce”
and rejecting Government’s argument that purchase of natural gas from an out-of-state provider,
obtaining a homeowner’s policy from an out-of-state insurer, and obtaining a mortgage loan
constitute “use” of the property in commerce).  
things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local
legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.190/
In another paper, Hamilton stops just short of ridiculing the notion that the “necessary and
proper” clause191/ could be used to “vary the law of descent in any State” or, “upon the pretense
of an interference with [the national government’s] revenues, abrogate a land tax imposed by the
authority of the State . . . .”192/
“Paradigmatic common-law state crime” is another such area, as the Court recognized in
Jones v. United States.193/  While the case seems predominantly an exercise in statutory
construction, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court does take the opportunity to reiterate that
“‘unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
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194/ Id. at 858, (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).  
195/ Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., with Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “well established
presumption against federal pre-emption of state law,” citing Ray v.  Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 157 (1978), and highlighting disparity between federal sentence (35 years) and
maximum state sentence (10 years) as threatening to displace State policy choice).  
changed  the federal-state balance’ in the prosecution of crimes,”194/ a point upon which Justice
Stevens expanded in concurrence.195/
Thus, with comparatively little effort, one can identify contracts, property, torts, trusts
and estates, family law, and criminal law as fundamental to the Tenth Amendment’s reservoir of
state sovereignty.  In short, it would have seemed uncontroversial to the Framers that basic
elements of the common law that the colonies had inherited from England (and that the states, by
statute, have incorporated into their legal regimes), together with the essential sovereign power
of defining what conduct is inimical to the public weal and subject to punishment as a crime,
form the irreducible minimum content of “traditional” state functions in the Tenth Amendment
vessel.  Other areas of law would, of necessity, evolve with the move from a predominantly
agrarian, 18th century society to a predominantly industrial contemporary one, including the
sovereign power (already enjoyed by the British Crown at the time of the Revolution) of
chartering bodies corporate, enacting laws for their governance, and prescribing legal rules (both
civil and criminal) to protect consumers from their predations.  
So much for the assertion in Garcia that the “integral” or “traditional” state function
approach is unworkable and unsound.  In fact, the converse is true: What the Court in Garcia
proposed to substitute for those functions is unworkable and unsound.  There, the majority
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196/ Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.  
197/ For representative literature by proponents of the political safeguards view, see,
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).  
198/ Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).  Interestingly, while
the Court has not expressly overruled Garcia, cases such as Morrison appear to indicate a
resounding rejection of the “political safeguards” approach.  The Court contrasted the lack of any
congressional findings in the Gun Free School Zones legislation (invalidated as outside the
commerce power in Lopez) with the numerous findings on the serious impact that gender-
motivated violence had (albeit indirectly) on interstate commerce.  United States v.  Morrison,
529 U.S. at 614.  Then, however, the Court simply rejected those findings and emphasized, as it
had in Lopez, that this was “ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court.”  Id.  (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2).  
opinion concluded that “the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the
Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of process rather than one of result.”196/
To invoke the political process as a source of protection of states’ rights197/ is at best an open
invitation to the federal courts to scrutinize congressional procedures for enacting, pursuant to
the commerce power, legislation that burdens the states, simply in order to ensure that their
interests have been adequately identified and protected.  That is an outright abdication of the
judicial function.198/  Today, the cynical among us, having viewed the spectacle provided by our
elected officials in confirmation hearings, in the election process, and in the omnipresent
scandals involving their personal peccadilloes, might justly doubt the ability of individual
members of Congress or the Executive branch to look after anything competently.  
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199/ New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946) (Douglas, J., with Black, J.,
dissenting).  
200/ See TRIBE, supra note 158.  A similar point is made by Yoo: 
[T]he political science underlying the idea that the interests of the
states were well represented in the national government was
probably outdated in 1954, and certainly was by 1980.  Ratification
of the Seventeenth Amendment appears to have severed any
institutional link between a state government and its senators. 
Changes in culture, technology, and the economy have diluted
regional and local identities in favor of politics that are national in
scope and in focus.  If there ever was a political culture that
emphasized reliance upon the states for the solution to social and
economic problems, the sweeping federal environmental,
economic, welfare, and entitlement laws of the 1960s and 1970s
replaced it with a mindset that seeks federal answers first.  The
Supreme Court in the same period federalized control over the
composition of the electorate, and presidential elections evolved
into a plebiscitary primary system.” 
Yoo, supra note 176, at 1321. 
Indeed, as Justices Douglas and Black observed over forty years ago, “The notion that the
sovereign position of the States must find its protection in the will of a transient majority of
Congress is foreign to and a negation of our constitutional system.”199/  Moreover, as even so
staunch an advocate of national power as Lawrence Tribe has noted, many of the political means
by which states were formerly able to make their presence felt on Capitol Hill -- such as the
appointment of United States Senators by state legislatures prior to adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment – are no longer available.200/
Garcia was concerned with the overtime and minimum-wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and held only that nothing about those provisions, as applied to public employees,
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201/ Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.  
202/ See id. at 586-89 (O’Connor, J., with Powell, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
203/ In its aftermath, the Garcia decision provoked, as might be expected, an
enormous outpouring of scholarly discussion and debate. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Federalism
and the Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. L. 459 (1987); Field, supra note 11; Andrzej 
Rapaczynski; From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 8
SUP. CT. REV. 341 (1986); David M. Skover, “Phoenix Rising” and Federalism Analysis, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1986); William L. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985).  
204/ Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-52.  
was “destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision.”201/ Garcia did
not overrule Hopkins Federal,202/ and where, as in the case of the Preemption Reg and the
Visitorial Powers Regs, federal intrusion into the domain of state regulation is undertaken by an
agency not only in the absence, as Justice Cardozo put it, of authority “explicitly conferred” by
Congress but even in the face of clear congressional intent that such authority not be conferred,
then both state sovereignty and Tenth Amendment principles are violated and the agency action
must be deemed invalid.  
This last point cannot be overemphasized.  For whatever one thinks of the Garcia
decision,203/ the prospects for its resuscitation, or the Supreme Court’s vacillation between
championing state sovereignty and championing congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, the underlying doctrinal premise of the majority opinion in Garcia and its restrictive
view of the Tenth Amendment is the implicit protection of state interests via their political
representation in the Congress.204/  Such a process-oriented doctrine of constitutional law has no
applicability, however, to the dealings of state legislatures and state agencies with federal
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205/ Regulatory capture describes the process by which regulated entities achieve
favorable rulemaking and enforcement results via the influence they wield over the regulators. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 448-
49 (1987); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713, 723-26 (1986).  Such capture is not unique to banking regulation, of course, but is, in fact,
the rational end result of the self-interest of any regulated entity and its interplay with both
legislators and administrative agencies tasked with the regulation in question.  Stigler’s
pathbreaking work has engendered additional scholarship and insights, some supportive of public
choice theory, some critical.  See, e.g.,Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974);Sam Peltzman, Toward A More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public
Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L.
Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 7 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Croley, supra note 168, at 42-45.  See also MANUEL F. COHEN &
GEORGE J. STIGLER, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT CONSUMERS? (1971); JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW
(1997).  
206/ Rent-seeking refers to obtaining government intervention for one’s own benefit --
garnering the  gains and limiting the losses that invariably flow from governmental acts.  It has
also been defined as “the attempt to obtain economic rents (payments for the use of an economic
asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in the market.”  Jonathan R.
(continued...)
agencies, where there can be no question of protection through political representation, other
than, perhaps, the usually fruitless tactic of appealing to one’s senator or congressman to
intercede.  
The political process aspect of this analysis is highlighted, moreover, by the peculiar
position of federal administrative agencies within our constitutional form of government.  An
administrative agency like the OCC is not accountable to the electorate and is subject to
institutional pressures largely indistinguishable from regulatory capture,205/ because the OCC
largely subsists, as do state bank regulators, on fees paid by the institutions they regulate, thereby
creating incentives to attract rent-seeking206/ banking organizations to the national charter.207/
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206/(...continued)
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).  Stigler and others have argued that rent-
seeking via government regulation is immanent in a political system such as ours.  See Stigler,
supra note 168, at 3; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-63 (2002). 
207/ See Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator Often
Helps Banks Fighting Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (quoting former
Comptroller Hawke, who “doesn't apologize for using the OCC’s power to override state and
local laws designed to protect consumers. Enjoying this aid provides an incentive for banks to
sign up with the OCC, he says.  ‘It is one of the advantages of a national charter, and I’m not the
least bit ashamed to promote it.’”).  
208/ Cf. Amy Bizar, Fred H. Miller, and Alvin C. Harrell, Introduction to the 2000
Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 1255, 1259 (2000)
(observing that unlike federal agencies that may view preemption of state laws as an integral part
of an empire-building strategy to expand their clout and jurisdiction, there is no centralized
regulatory constituency at the state level that inherently benefits from federalizing consumer law
as opposed to considering alternatives such as the Uniform Consumer Credit Code).  
Those financial incentives make the agency’s decision-making process susceptible to error in
ways that are not implicated when the decisionmaker is an elected body.208/  Under these
circumstances, the Tenth Amendment retains its vitality even under the Garcia approach.  This is
especially the case where, as here, the elected body has expressed its will that states be free to
exercise their existing regulatory authority across a broad array of substantive areas of law over
all banks doing business within their borders, whether federally chartered or state-chartered.
A potentially useful analogy can be made to the Burford abstention doctrine, under which
federal courts will decline to adjudicate matters that, though properly within their jurisdiction,
would intrude unnecessarily into matters of importance to the states and disrupt the
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209/ See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).  See also New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (Burford
abstention appropriate where case “presents difficult questions of law bearing on policy problems
of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar” or if
its adjudication in a federal forum “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a mater of substantial public concern.”) (quoting Colorado R. Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)) Accord, Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1996).  
210/ WILLIAM J. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 64-65 
(1968).  
administration of complex state regulatory schemes.209/  Proceeding from the Burford doctrine, it
may not be amiss, then, to suggest that, as a matter of comity and federalism, federal bank
regulatory agencies, like the federal courts, ought to be chary of entering into this arena and
disrupting the continuity of comprehensive programs of state regulation.  This is true especially
where there is every indication that state authorities are as well equipped as their federal
counterparts to monitor compliance by national banks with state law and to do so without
trammeling the OCC’s visitorial powers and its independent authority to correct unsafe or
unsound practices and bring enforcement actions for violations of law.  
The significance of the dual system regulation in the evolution of the financial services
industry in the United States can scarcely be overstated.  It has been noted that “one of the
historic objectives of dual banking has been to provide alternative supervisory frameworks under
which commercial banks may choose to operate, thereby safeguarding against the extension of
harsh, oppressive, and discriminatory supervision to institutions without recourse to alternative
arrangements.”210/  Moreover, the dual banking system has fostered competition and healthy
advances in the industry, and the states have historically been responsible for a variety of
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211/ New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
innovations which are now commonplace: branch banking, real estate lending, trust department
operations, and transaction accounts.  
States, as smaller markets, are ideal environments in which to innovate and experiment
without putting the entire banking system at risk.  That is just as true for state predatory lending
and consumer protection legislation as it is for any other area.  Federal regulators should
therefore support this effort.  Indeed, as Justice Brandeis recognized over seventy years ago: 
There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions
to meet changing social and economic needs . . . .
*        *        *        *
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.211/
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212/
“The enactment by the Congress of this chapter shall not be construed as
preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may
hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.”  12
U.S.C. § 1846.  A comment in the Senate Report underscores the point: “It is always of
uppermost importance in legislation of this nature to preserve the dual system of National and
State banks . . . .”   S. REP. NO. 1095, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5  (1956).  
213/ See text accompanying notes 115 - 117, supra.  
214/ Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 357, citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S.
468, 474-75 (2003); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85, 86 (1987); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412, 415
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000 (D. Minn.
2001).  
Congress, of course, is well aware that the dual banking system is an important source of
innovation and progress and has consistently sought to preserve it, as is clear from Section 7 of
the BHC Act212/ and from the IBBEA.213/
III
Professor Wilmarth’s article cites case law for the proposition that the federal judiciary is
chary of interpreting federal statutes in a manner that would do violence to longstanding
principles of state corporate law, absent some affirmative indication to the contrary from
Congress.214/   Thus OCC’s attempt to shut out state officials from regulating state-chartered
operating subsidiaries of national banks not only violates basic tenets of corporate law and
corporate governance but infringes upon the states’ sovereign interests in violation of the Tenth
Amendment.  In order to provide reviewing courts – in this and other areas – with an analytical
framework with which to assess such claims, the following modest flow chart, distilled from the
history of the Tenth Amendment summarized in Part II, is offered.  
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215/ Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 508 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).  
216/ E.g., the McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra note 89; IBBEA, supra note 56; 
GLEBA, supra note 99.  
When confronted with the question whether a regulation or similar pronouncement of a
federal administrative agency is consistent with the requirements of the Tenth Amendment,
consider the following set of indicators:
1 Is the federal regulation authorized pursuant to an express grant of power to
Congress under Article I?  (If not, go directly to item 7, below).  
2 If so, is the object of the federal regulation properly within the scope of such
power?215/   (If not, go directly to item 7, below).  
3 If so, does the federal regulation fall squarely within an area in which Congress
has expressly legislated to grant or preserve regulatory authority for the states?216/ (If the answer
is “Yes,” go directly to item 7, below).
4 If not, does the federal regulation “commandeer” the State legislature or officials
of the State’s executive branch?  (If so, go directly to item 7, below).  
5. If not, does the federal regulation seek to invalidate, or have the effect of
invalidating (as opposed to merely supplementing), State laws in any of the following areas:
! land use;
! other property laws;
! contract and commercial laws (other than for contracts with agencies or
instrumentalities of the federal government);
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! tort law;
! fiduciary relations (trust) law;
! domestic relations (family) law;
! crimes as defined by the State legislature;
! corporation, agency, or partnership law; or
! consumer protection law?
If not, the federal regulation likely does not abridge the Tenth Amendment and, if otherwise
meeting constitutional muster, constitutes a valid exercise of federal administrative authority.  
6. If so, does the federal regulation seek to invalidate that law on the grounds that it
impinges individual rights and liberties guaranteed under the Bill of Rights and made applicable
to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment?  If so, there are constitutional issues to be
litigated, and the State law in question may well be invalidated upon judicial review.  If not, go
to item 7.
7. The regulation is presumptively an unconstitutional interference with State
sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.  
CONCLUSION
The sweeping authority asserted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in
recent years to preempt a broad array of state laws, including consumer protection laws, when
these are applied not only to national banks but even to their state-chartered operating
subsidiaries, raises troubling questions about the proper allocation of regulatory authority
between the federal government and the several states.  One fundamental source of authority that
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in theory would vitiate the OCC's assertion of preemption but that is often overlooked by the
courts, and, in their desultory consideration thereof, occasionally treated dismissively, is the
Tenth Amendment.  This article suggests that rescue and resuscitation of that Amendment from
its undeserved desuetude are in order.  What is needed for that revival is an analytical
framework.  Such a framework can be distilled from the Framers' commentary and debates and,
particularly in light of the centrality of judicial review to the Framer's federalism design, can
provide the Tenth Amendment with substantive content that the courts can credibly enforce.  
